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Abstract 
Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management 
mechanisms, but the nature of such systems poses particular problems for satisfying those 
requirements. Among these problems are investment hold-up risks rooted in the competition 
facing both electricity retailers and large industrial firms. Additional problems include those of 
load profile, information and bargaining mismatches between generators and customers. 
Significantly, hold-up risks exist not only between retailers and generators, but also affect (e.g. 
fuel) suppliers upstream of generators. Contracts are one means of addressing such problems, 
and represent a particular improvement on spot market trading alone. However, we argue that 
market contracting in electricity systems is a costly approach to addressing hold-up and related 
problems, and that internal organisation (i.e. vertical integration) is a more efficient alternative, 
minimising the overall costs of market contracting and ownership. Not only does integration 
internalise wholesale market risks and market power costs to the integrated firm, thereby 
reducing their importance, it also reduces the need for and efficacy of regulation to constrain 
generator market power. It furthermore thins contract markets, reducing the threat of generator 
hold-up from competitive retail entry, and otherwise supports generation investment and hence 
supply security. While the reinstatement or retention of retail franchise areas is one possible 
solution to the problems of contracting, it is arguably unnecessary if there are other system 
features (such as transmission constraints) impeding retail entry. This is particularly so in systems 
involving vertical integration, although even then policy makers are confronted with a trade-off 
between promoting retail competition and facilitating generation investment and supply security, 
requiring judgement as to the optimal degree of retail market power. While vertical integration is 
a more natural and self-sustaining solution to electricity sector problems, it too is only a partial 
solution, leaving complementary roles for spot and long-term contract markets. 
 
                                                 
†  Prepared for the “Efficiency, Competition and Long Term Contracts in Electricity Markets” 
workshop organised by LARSEN and the Loyola de Palacio Chair of the European University 
Institute, European University Institute, Florence, 15-16 January 2009. 
1  Corresponding author. 
1 Introduction 
Many economists and policy-makers have held the view that electricity sectors 
should be unbundled and opened to competition, and that in such liberalized markets 
long-term contracts are necessary to constrain generator market power, elicit competitive 
entry in retailing, and support new generation investment and hence supply security 
(Boom & Buehler (2006), Vázquez et al, (2002)). In light of this view, the observation 
that liberalized markets in several countries are showing low or decreasing levels of long-
term contracting, and high or increasing levels of vertical integration, (Thomas (2004), 
Anderson et al. (2007), Hogan and Meade (2007); Gans and Wolak (2008)) has led to 
concerns about market performance. In particular, policy-makers are concerned that 
wholesale and retail competition will decrease, and generation investment and supply 
security may be under threat (European Commission (2007); Michaels (2006)).  
However, problems have emerged with the “traditional” view regarding sector 
unbundling and competition (Green (2004), Chao et al. (2005, 2008) Finon and Perez 
(2008)). In particular, excessive competitive entry in retailing may threaten the viability of 
short- and long-term contracts, and thus threaten—rather than promote—generation 
investment and supply security. This threat emerges because “excess” entry creates 
critical hold-up risks between retailers and consumers, which in turn translates into hold-
up risks for generators, and ultimately their fuel suppliers and financiers. Ironically, this 
leads to a conundrum – a liquid contracts market is seen as necessary to elicit retail entry, 
but risk of too much entry undermines the supply and viability of such contracts. 
In this paper, we further elaborate on problems arising in contract markets in 
electricity systems, identifying multiple possible causes of hold-up as well as other 
contracting problems that can result in inadequate investment and supply security, and 
increased threat of market power. Specifically, hold-up risks arise not just from the threat 
of competitive retail entry, but also due to the competition faced by industrial customers, 
and other factors such as generator fuel mix and fuel supply security. Additionally, 
contracting in electricity systems is further complicated by factors such as mismatches in 
the preferred load profiles of generators and contract counterparties, information 
asymmetries regarding generator outage rates and fuel security, generator market power, 
and strategic bargaining. The resulting shortcomings in electricity contract markets 
suggest they are at best a partial and unsustainable solution to market power, retail 
competition, investment and supply security issues. Instead we argue they are largely a 
disequilibrium institution, often arising artificially as an imposed element of electricity 
liberalisations reflecting initial reform priorities and concerns. 
We then present the view that high levels of vertical integration should not be a 
cause for concern, but rather may represent a more “natural” structure for the electricity 
sector. Where contracts have failed to emerge or operate as expected, and political 
priorities have shifted away from constraining generator market power in favour of 
ensuring supply security, the relative importance of contracts in the scheme of electricity 
system governance has diminished in favour of increased vertical integration (with both 
contracting and spot energy markets providing complementary and supporting roles). 
Such vertical integration is, by contrast, argued to be a more self-sustaining institutional 
arrangement, and one which better addresses issues of wholesale market power, 
investment, and supply security. Its endogenous rise – even in electricity systems with 
relatively liquid contract markets – further suggests it has a natural and important role to 
play in liberalised electricity systems. 
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In part these benefits flow from vertical integration being better insulated than 
long-term contracts from the hold-up risks of excessive retail (or industrial) competition.  
They also arise from the fundamental changes in generator wholesale market risks and 
incentives arising when generators have embedded customers. At the same time the 
existence of such benefits calls into question whether concerns about the potential 
deterrent effect of vertical integration on competitive retail entry are misplaced. This is 
not only because long-term contracting can also have the same effect on market power 
and entry (Newbery (1998), Bushnell et al. (2007)), but also because there is a clear trade-
off emerging in liberalised electricity sectors between retail competition and supply 
security objectives. This trade-off challenges the ongoing priority given in most 
liberalised electricity systems to further enhance retail competition, and to constraining 
generator wholesale market power (which is both less important and harder to achieve in 
integrated systems). While some amount of retail competition is important for consumer 
protection, at some point additional competition becomes counter-productive, not only 
for investment and supply security purposes, but also for retail market competitiveness 
itself. 
Following our review of the constraints inherent in contracting and the role of 
vertical integration, we argue for a variation on the conclusion for policy proposed by 
authors such as Newbery (2002), Roques (2008) and Chao et al. (2005, 2008), who have 
argued for the retention or reinstatement of retail franchise monopolies as a means to 
constrain hold-up risks between retailers and consumers. We argue that such measures 
are possibly unnecessary provided other electricity system features attenuating retail 
competition are in place, and probably too great a reversion towards pre-reform 
arrangements (to consumers’ detriment). Instead, if policy responses are required to 
ensure supply security while also eliciting workable but not excessive retail competition, 
they should include less focus on generator market power, a greater tolerance of vertical 
integration, and a reduced emphasis on contracting. These could be complemented with 
other retail-level innovations – such as enhancing demand side responsiveness for small 
consumers – which do not exacerbate retail level hold-up risks but alleviate market 
power concerns by means other than competition. 
 In the remainder of this paper we first set out our analytical framework, drawing 
on the transaction cost economics and property rights literatures, and empirical 
literatures on both contracting and vertical integration (in general but also specifically for 
electricity sectors). We stress the importance of contracts in addressing hold-up 
problems, but also the circumstances in which ownership (specifically, vertical 
integration) is a preferable approach. These circumstances involve optimally assigning 
firm (whether generator or retailer) ownership to the party enjoying the lowest overall 
costs of contracting and internal organisation. 
 Section 3 discusses the expectations and experience of contracting in 
decentralised (liberalised) electricity systems. The particular problems confronting 
contracting in electricity systems are examined, and the shortcomings of contracting 
given those problems are highlighted. Section 4 then sets out the ways in which vertical 
integration better addresses those electricity system problems than does contracting. 
While vertical integration is argued to be a more natural and self-sustaining primary 
approach to addressing electricity sector problems such as risk management, securing 
investment and addressing generator market power, it is not without its limitations. Some 
of these are examined, and it is argued that both spot and long-term market contracting 
are natural complements to vertical integration. Finally, in section 5 we conclude with a 
discussion of the resulting policy implications. 
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2 Analytical Framework  
 
In this section we present a framework for reviewing the roles of long-term 
contracts and vertical integration. We largely draw from the transaction costs theory of 
governance structure, under which a firm’s choice of governance mechanism (such as 
contracting or vertically integrating) is based on the costs that firm faces in attempting to 
transact in the market (Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)). We also discuss the importance 
of ownership costs (following, in particular, Hansmann (1996)) which interact with 
transaction costs to influence governance choice. We conclude the section with a brief 
discussion of how our general framework applies more specifically to electricity systems, 
looking in particular at the occurrence of vertical integration in such systems and what 
this means in terms of market outcomes. This leads in to our more detailed exploration 
of electricity contracts and vertical integration in Sections 3 and 4.     
        
2.1 A Spectrum of  Governance Choices 
 
Sector transactions may be governed under a spectrum of different (explicit or 
implicit) contracting mechanisms, ranging from markets to firms to bureaucracies 
(Williamson (1985)). Because each mechanism provides a different level of incentives and 
involves different costs, each will be “ideal” under a different set of conditions (related to 
transaction costs, organisational costs, incentives, and ownership). However, experience 
and theory suggest that a given sector will seldom favour a single ideal governance 
mechanism; rather, different sector needs and characteristics give rise to complementary 
combinations of governance mechanisms.  
 
2.1.1 From Markets to Bureaucracies: Moving Along the Spectrum 
 
Williamson (1985, p. 87) starts from the premise that “in the beginning there 
were markets” and hence that “Only as market-mediated contracts break down are the 
transactions in question removed from markets and organised internally.” This suggests a 
hierarchy among the alternative governance forms (see Figure 1), with markets being 
presumed the most desirable form in situations in which they are feasible, then private 
internal organisation (firms), then bureaucracies (which may be thought of as “political 
markets”).  
However, as Figure 1 indicates, markets are feasible in a narrower range of 
conditions than firms and bureaucracies are. As the nature of the transaction changes, so 
too does the ideal form of governance, leading to a shift “down” the hierarchy (e.g. from 
spot markets to long term contracts) or re-balancing of the mix of governance 
mechanisms used (e.g. some spot contracts may remain, but the majority of trading may 
be through long-term contracts).  
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Figure 1: Different governance mechanisms are feasible in different ranges of conditions 
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Which governance mechanism is ideal for a given set of transactions depends on 
two key factors: 
 The size of transaction costs relative to internal organisation costs. Coase (1937) 
suggested that transaction costs were the deciding factor between market-
organised (spot and long-term contracts) and internally-organised (firm based) 
transactions. Relevant transaction costs include search and price discovery 
costs, as well as market-distorting taxes or regulation. Transaction costs tend 
to increase with increasing transaction frequency, decreasing numbers of 
potential trading partners (often due to increasing asset specificity), and 
increasing temporal specificity (leading to a risk of hold-up); and 
 The desirability of strong incentives. The desirability of strong incentives depends 
on the extent of imbalances (asymmetries) between the transacting parties in 
respect of market power, incentives to behave opportunistically, information, 
endowments and risk preferences. As Figure 1 indicates, incentives weaken as 
transactions shift away from markets and towards bureaucracies.  
 
From Spot Markets to Longer-term Contracts 
In situations with low transaction costs, symmetric information, and limited 
market power or risk of opportunistic behaviour, spot markets are both a feasible and 
desirable mechanism for governing exchange – they provide strong incentives and have 
low organisational costs. 
As transaction costs increase, and the desirability of strong incentives decreases, 
other forms of governance become more feasible and desirable. This may involve a shift 
from spot type contracts to longer term contracts.  For example, Adler et al. (1998) note 
different contract types (such as fixed-fee or cost-plus) are preferred in different 
transaction cost conditions. These conditions include contract knowledge (“the contact 
hours the seller and buyer require to learn each other’s requirements to complete the 
transaction”) and contract impediments (“the inability of the buyer to adequately state 
contractual terms to the seller, ultimately lengthening contract duration, and changing the 
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technical design”).2 Fixed-price, spot-type contracts are only feasible when contract 
impediments are low; as it becomes more difficult to state performance requirements in 
full, longer-term, more incentivised contracts play a greater role. 
 
From Contracts to Firms 
As transaction costs increase further, the shift may be from contracts to firms. 
For example, as noted by Coase (1937), in repeated market-based transactions either 
repeated contracting (such as through the repeated use of spot markets) or long-term 
contracts are required. Such contracts need to be specific about the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties in all relevant states of nature. Achieving such specificity – or 
contractual completeness – becomes increasingly difficult as asymmetric information, 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and transaction costs increase. In such situations, 
internalising transactions with a firm may be a more desirable form of governance. When 
contracts are internalised they can be less prescriptive and comprehensive. Furthermore, 
instead of relying on external contract monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the 
firm can devise internal mechanisms and tailor these to the particular nature of the 
transactions.  
Authors such as Williamson (1985) extend Coase’s theory further by highlighting 
the importance of asset specificity in motivating internal organisation (through firms or 
vertical integration) over market-based transacting. When parties to a contract make 
long-lived relationship-specific investments, they are then exposed to the risk of ex post 
opportunistic behaviour in which either or both of them seek to extract rents from the 
other by renegotiating or reneging on (i.e. “holding-up”) the contract once the 
relationship-specific  investments have been made (i.e. sunk). This exposure arises 
because these investments cannot be costlessly redeployed in the event of hold-up. Such 
behaviour, if anticipated by the contracting parties, results in less contracting and 
investment than the parties might otherwise jointly prefer, unless they can otherwise 
credibly commit to each other not to act opportunistically. Where such commitment 
mechanisms are too costly to institute, ownership of one party by the other can be a 
viable alternative – whence the rationale for either backwards or upstream vertical 
integration (one party owning its supplier) or forwards or downstream integration (one 
party owning its customers). 
 
From Firms to Bureaucracies 
Finally, at the far end of the spectrum from markets, where transaction costs are 
particularly high, and high-powered incentives would exacerbate problems such as 
market power, asymmetric information and opportunism, bureaucracy can be the optimal 
governance form – it provides weaker incentives and, although it has higher internal 
organisation costs, these would be offset by the benefits of avoided transaction costs.  
 
                                                 
2  The authors take their findings from a review of contract data from the United States Air Force. Unlike some other 
sectors, where contractual information may be unavailable or proprietary—as, indeed is currently the case with most 
electricity contracts in New Zealand—the authors find the Air Force equipment manufacturing and purchasing 
records to be fairly complete. 
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Multiple Forms of Governance 
Importantly, different forms of governance may not be mutually exclusive – in 
other words, in some circumstance firms may not choose a single “optimal” governance 
form based on their overall transaction costs, but rather use multiple forms to address 
different market needs. For example, Wolak (1996) notes that electric utilities in the 
United States use both spot and long-term contracts, simultaneously, to purchase the 
same product (coal, although the situation is similar for gas and oil purchases, and also 
occurs in the water sector with bulk water purchases).  From his analysis of price and 
demand data, Wolak (1996) concludes that, although long-term contracts are good for 
ensuring supply stability for the majority of demand, “for the most part, plants use spot 
market transactions to satisfy residual demands due to unforeseen events and are willing 
to pay even higher prices for and purchase from even more distant suppliers the larger is 
this residual demand” (p. 164). Thus, spot contracts play an important role in 
complementing long-term contracts; a role that may also be played in relation to vertical 
integration, which shares many structural similarities with long-term contracts.  
 
2.1.2 The Boundary Between Contracts and Firms 
 
The particular governance “boundary” that we are interested in for this paper is 
that between market-based contracting and vertical integration of otherwise contracting 
partners within a firm. Hansmann (1996) provides a useful model for thinking about how 
market participants decide which side of the boundary to fall on. He acknowledges that 
long-term contracts have their virtues – in particular, they can be an effective remedy to 
many of the problems related to reliance on spot transactions. Long-term contracts may 
be designed to avoid hold-up problems (such as when an investor wants to avoid sinking 
costs in a long-lived asset only to be held up by its counter-party upon the renewal of a 
short-term supply contract). Long-term contracts can also be used to allocate specific 
risks – for example, determining to what extent a supplier is liable for interruptions to 
supply.  Finally, long-term contracts may be used to mitigate adverse selection risks – for 
example, requiring performance warranties where product or service quality becomes 
apparent over time. 
However, Hansmann (1996) also notes that long-term contracts have costs 
which, if high enough, will favour vertical integration. He points out that severe 
problems of contractual imperfection or incompleteness can arise from a combination of 
asset specificity (i.e. physical and human capital with large sunk costs), temporal 
specificity (i.e. the requirement that certain products and services be provided at specific 
times), and  high contracting costs. These combined factors explain, for example, why 
farmer-ownership of dairy processors (i.e. downstream vertical integration) often 
dominates over investor-owned processors. Product perishability exposes farmers to 
daily hold-up problems, and homogeneity of interest lowers costs of collective decision 
making. Similarly, customer-owned rural electricity distribution cooperatives, and 
upstream generation and transmission cooperatives in the US – both examples of 
upstream vertical integration – can be explained in terms of low collective decision 
making costs (homogeneity of interests) as well as risk of market power abuse by 
investor-owned firms (or the absence of such firms where investment is not profitable).  
Findings in other sectors confirm this preference for vertical integration when 
contracting costs are high and contracts are necessarily incomplete. For example, from a 
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review of over 100 empirical studies across a range of sectors,3 Lafontaine and Slade 
(2007) find substantial evidence that the following factors significantly increase the 
presence of backwards vertical integration (that is, influence firms to “make” rather than 
to “buy”): 
 Greater specificity of physical capital and of human capital; 
 More dedicated and more complex assets; 
 Greater site specificity (in other words, when co-location is more important); 
 Greater temporal specificity (in other words, when there is a greater need to 
integrate transactions, and have a timely supply, to avoid “hold-ups”); and 
 Greater uncertainty about demand.4 
Similarly, Lajili et al. (2007) conclude from their review of over 50 studies that 
“empirical findings generally corroborate the importance of various forms of 
relationship-specific investments for explaining and predicting vertical integration” (p. 
15). In particular, their review confirms the significance of transaction frequency, 
numbers of trading partners, asset specificity, certainty of asset life span, and demand 
uncertainty in the decision to vertically integrate. They note that several of these factors 
are interrelated: for example, higher levels of asset specificity limit the number of trading 
partners, making it more likely that the firm will be inclined to vertically integrate.  
 
Ownership Costs Combine with Transaction Costs to Affect Governance Decisions 
Hansmann (1996) extends the discussion of the importance of transaction costs 
in vertical integration decisions to include a discussion of property rights or ownership 
costs.5 Under his scheme, ownership optimally falls to the class of firm patrons (i.e. 
suppliers, customers, workers, capital providers) enjoying the lowest combined costs of 
market contracting and ownership (i.e. internal organisation). For example, if market 
contracting costs should happen to be highest for a patron class that also has the lowest 
costs of ownership, then clearly they are the best patrons to own the organisation. 
Market contracting costs include the costs of hold-up risks, market power (e.g. 
bargaining imbalance in the contacting process), asymmetric information and strategic 
bargaining (where a better informed party to the contract negotiates better terms at the 
other’s expense), problems in credibly signalling patron preferences and the costs of 
long-term contracting. To this can be added regulatory risk (see also Helm (1994)6). 
                                                 
3  Including naval shipbuilding, engineering, automobile manufacturing, apparel, chemical products, coal and 
electricity, trucking, and others. 
4  Interestingly, Klein and Murphy (1997) propose that vertical integration is more likely in conditions of uncertainty 
not because of asset specificity-related transaction costs, but because uncertainty makes it more likely that an 
explicitly specified performance contract “will move outside the self-enforcing range” (p. 420). 
5  Hart (1995) and Whinston (2003) go further, suggesting that a property rights model may be a better explanatory 
approach than transaction costs. The property rights model argues that asset ownership changes investment 
incentives because the property rights confer the right to make decisions on asset use if contingencies arise that were 
not specified for in a contract, and the likely outcomes of ex post bargaining will affect ex ante investment. Despite 
the potential for property rights theory as an explanatory tool, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) observe that there has 
been little testing of property rights theories of integration. From what testing has been, they conclude that property 
rights theory appears best able to predict manufacturer-retailer or franchisor-franchisee relationships, whereas it has 
less support from studies of supplier-manufacturer relationships (which strongly support a transaction costs theory 
of integration). 
6  Helm (1994) notes that regulators generally review and approve utility costs every three to five years. This period is 
very short compared with investments in major utility assets, which are typically made over a much longer term. 
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Ownership costs, by contrast, include the costs of internal governance mechanisms (i.e. 
the classic agency costs of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983)), the 
costs of collective decision making, and the costs of risk bearing (which relates to 
patrons’ diversification and access to capital)). 
Under Hansmann’s (1996) scheme, vertical integration is a mechanism for 
internalising a range of risks and costs to the firm. By dispensing with the contracting 
requirements of market-based transactions there are savings in terms of both direct 
contracting costs and the costs arising from imperfect contracting. Incentives for 
opportunism are mitigated (though perhaps replaced to some extent by agency costs of 
internal governance), since the costs of that opportunism are borne within the same 
organisation. Exposure to volatile market prices is removed (or at least substantially 
reduced), since price changes that disadvantage one part of the firm advantage another. 
Information asymmetries give rise to agency costs of internal governance, but once again 
the costs of asymmetric information and strategic bargaining are internalised to the firm 
and hence should be lower overall than when they are borne by only one party to a 
contract. Although opportunities for double marginalisation may arise through 
integration, exercise of market power may now become moot, since monopoly pricing in 
one part of the firm directly increases costs in another part, leaving total firm profit 
unchanged (Hogan and Meade (2007)). By removing market variables from the firm’s 
objective function (or simply from view), vertical integration also reduces the risk of (and 
scope for) adverse regulatory interventions such as price regulation. Integration can also 
remove the need for otherwise beneficial regulation, since the integrated firm internalises 
the costs that such regulation would seek to mitigate. It is only when the costs of 
ownership exceed these combined cost savings that market contracting should remain 
preferred to vertical integration. 
 
2.2 Governance Choices for Electricity Systems 
 
We now turn to governance mechanisms in electricity systems, focusing in 
particular on where vertical integration has taken precedence over contracting. We first 
outline the types of vertical integration that might be expected under our analytical 
framework, then briefly review actual vertical integration and contracting that has 
occurred in various electricity markets. Finally, we summarise findings from the literature 
on what the impacts of vertical integration have been. Despite fears that vertical 
integration would enable firms to exercise market power, preventing entry and pushing 
up prices, evidence suggests vertical integration may in fact have had a positive effect on 
market competitiveness and consumer welfare, as well as investment and hence security 
of supply.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
Although investors seek long-term contracts to mitigate the risk of their long-term investments, regulators generally 
have discretion to make decisions that conflict with the contractual terms—for example, approving a lower amount 
of expenditure than envisaged in the contract. Vertical integration (particularly forwards) may be the best solution to 
such regulatory risk—for example, Helm (p. 20) notes, “Oil companies have backed their refinery assets with petrol 
retailing outlets. Breweries have invested in pubs. In the utilities, franchises have been established by statute to 
assure a contracting base.” 
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2.2.1 Expected Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets 
 
In considering the use of vertical integration instead of contracting in 
decentralised electricity markets, two variants might be expected. The first involves 
downstream vertical integration by generators into activities such as retailing, or less 
commonly into large industrial activities. It might also involve downstream integration by 
fuel suppliers into generation. The second variant involves upstream integration between 
retailers or large industrial customers (whether alone or in concert with others) into 
generation. Under Hansmann’s (1996) scheme whether such upstream or downstream 
integration is to be preferred depends on the balance of ownership and market 
contracting costs faced by suppliers and customers. Downstream integration by 
generators creates agency costs, but likely involves low costs of collective decision 
making and risk bearing. Upstream integration by numerous small customers possibly 
involves prohibitive costs of collective decision making, especially where such customers 
have heterogeneous preferences. Conversely, upstream integration by large customers or 
retailers (who aggregate small customers) either involves fewer such collective decision 
making costs, or internalises them to the firm.  
Whether or not these relative costs are determinative as between upstream or 
downstream integration depends on the costs of market contracting faced by each patron 
class. Multiple small customers may face risks of generator market power, but if 
electricity is a small part of their total expenditure then the costs of contracting with 
generators will likely bias them to do so via retailers (for whom the costs of market 
power are more concentrated, and contracting costs are lower). When large electricity 
customers are at risk of hold-up by generators (for example, through unfavourable 
contract negotiation in the presence of generator market power or asymmetric 
information regarding plant or fuel availability) then they may prefer upstream 
integration despite having relatively low contracting costs (as compared with small 
customers). Indeed, this is even more so if their ownership costs are lower still.  
 
2.2.2 Observed Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets 
 
The theoretical expectations outlined above have been borne out to different 
extents in different markets. The New Zealand and Spanish markets, among others, are 
notable for their high degrees of vertical integration between generators and retailers. In 
New Zealand, generation is dominated by five integrated companies (“gen-tailers”), 
accounting for around 91% of generation capacity and 97% of total demand (Hogan and 
Meade (2007)). Similarly, in Spain, four integrated firms account for 93% of generation 
and 97% of retail sales (Kuhn and Machado (2004)). A further notable example is the 
PJM system in the US, where the six largest retailers also retained their generation assets 
at restructuring, accounting for roughly 70% of the retail market and 90% of generation 
capacity (Bushnell, Mansur & Saravia (2007)).  
Although such a high degree of vertical integration has been characteristic of, for 
example, the PJM and New Zealand markets since restructuring in the 1990s, other 
markets began with a fully disaggregated sector (post-restructuring) that has subsequently 
moved towards greater integration (for a comparison of the sizes and characteristics of 
these different markets, see Appendix A). For example, the UK market had three major 
generation companies and 22 retailers in 1990, but now features substantial vertical 
integration: in 2005, six major retailers, collectively owning approximately 50% of the 
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country’s generation assets, supplied 99% of electricity customers (International Energy 
Agency (2005)). Similarly, Australia began with complete separation of generation and 
retailing in the mid-1990s, but now vertical integration appears to be becoming a 
“dominant strategy” both in Victoria (where the first retailer purchases of generation 
assets occurred) and throughout the National Electricity Market (NEM) (Simhauser 
(2007)). As of 2007, four major retail businesses, with a combined 75% of market share, 
had ownership stakes in approximately 73 percent of generation assets (NERA (2007)).  
In both the UK and Australia, mergers and acquisitions between retailers and 
generators were not explicitly prohibited by new regulations, and have generally been 
approved by competition authorities (although initially the Loy Yang merger in Australia 
was opposed by the ACCC on competition grounds, which decision was later overruled 
by the Federal Court – Gans and Wolak (2008)). In contrast, in markets such as 
California, regulation brought in during reforms required complete separation, excluding 
the possibility of any vertical integration (or long-term contracts). 
More recently, the observation that liberalised markets in several countries are 
showing low or decreasing levels of contracting, and high or increasing levels of vertical 
integration, (Thomas (2004), Anderson et al. (2007), Gans & Wolak (2008)) has led to 
concerns about market performance. In particular, policy-makers are concerned that 
wholesale and retail competition will decrease, and generation investment and supply 
security may be under threat (European Commission (2007), Michaels (2006)). However, 
as we discuss below, fears that vertical integration will lead to the exercise of market 
power and welfare losses appear to be unfounded. 
 
2.2.3 Impacts of Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets 
 
In line with view that mergers within markets may have an anti-competitive 
effect, some economists have proposed that vertical integration enables firms to exercise 
market power (through foreclosure or through other means), resulting in higher retail 
prices (Micola et al. (2008), Gans (20007)). Similarly, the European Commission (2007) 
recently observed that vertical integration appears to reduce liquidity in European 
electricity markets, and may constrain entry. 
However, Bushnell et al. (2007) note that although foreclosure is a concern in 
markets with vertical integration (between generation, retail and distribution or 
transmission),7 it is seldom a problem in practice due to open access and non-
discriminatory pricing requirements for distribution and transmission networks. Mansur 
(2007) explores the relationship between vertical integration and market power further, 
reviewing activity in the PJM electricity market before and after restructuring. He finds 
that restructuring in the PJM market led to an increase in anti-competitive behaviour by 
vertically-integrated firms that were large net-sellers, but that vertical integration overall 
had a mitigating effect on market power. He also finds (2008) that the likely welfare 
impacts of the exercise of market power were relatively small, leading to prices only 3% 
to 8% above a competitive benchmark. 
In fact, evidence suggests that vertical integration may be associated with lower 
prices than those experienced in a fully unbundled sector. By running simulations based 
                                                 
7  Foreclosure is not a significant problem with vertical integration between retail and generation alone, as there is 
commonly no natural monopoly element in retailing to be used to discriminate against competitors. 
 11
on the performance in the three largest and oldest US electricity markets – California, 
PJM and New England – Bushnell et al. (2007) find that vertical integration may in fact 
result in the exercise of less market power and contribute to lower retail prices than in an 
unbundled sector, controlling for horizontal market structure. These findings may be 
explained by the fact that, with vertical separation, retailers lack a “natural hedge” and 
face potentially extreme wholesale price risk, deterring entry and reducing retail market 
competition. Hogan and Meade (2007) support these findings of lower retail prices in 
their model of spot wholesale and retail electricity markets. They find that generators 
always overstate prices when vertically separated from retailers, although this incentive 
falls as market share decreases. Conversely, when generators are vertically integrated 
(with the same retail market share as their respective wholesale market share), they do 
not overstate their supply curves. They also find that retail prices are higher in a market 
with vertical separation than in one with full integration. 
Vertical integration may also have a positive impact on investment. As Newbery 
(2002) explains, competing retailers in a vertically separated market tend to prefer short-
term over long-term contracts to mitigate their risk of falling wholesale prices. This 
increases the wholesale price risks to generators, leading to a decrease in investment. In 
such a situation, generators will have incentives to vertically integrate with retailers (and 
horizontally integrate with other generators) in a bid to increase prices to more profitable 
levels. Thus, vertical integration allows both retailers and generators to manage risks (a 
commonality of interest also noted by Chao et al. (2005) and Meade (2001)), and in doing 
so also enables increased investment.  
In line with these findings, evidence also suggests that de-integration 
(unbundling) may be harmful in sectors with existing vertical integration. For example, 
Bushnell et al. (2007) find that if the PJM and New England markets had been forced to 
fully unbundle (as happened in California) retail prices in those areas would have been 
significantly higher, as would have production inefficiencies.8 In a similar vein, Michaels 
(2006), and Sioshansi and Oren (2007) note that forced divestitures may increase 
incentives for firms to exercise market power. In a review of empirical studies of gasoline 
refining and sales, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) find that “divorcement” can lead to cost 
and price increases and a reduction in service quality. Thus, vertical integration may in 
fact be better for consumers – a conclusion supported by Cooper et al. (2005) in their 
review of empirical evidence from a range of industries. 
This range of findings on the potentially positive impacts of vertical integration 
contrasts with the view that vertical integration is a sign of sector weakness, particularly 
where such integration leads to small and illiquid contracts markets (which have 
previously been viewed as a key determinant of strong sector performance).  We explore 
this contrast further in the following sections, using the framework presented in this 
section to first explore the roles that contracts markets can realistically play in the 
electricity sector, and then to better understand the situations in which vertical 
integration may be a “natural” and superior alternative – alongside contracting to some 
degree – for managing risks and supporting investment in electricity systems. 
                                                 
8  The authors estimate these inefficiencies would have resulted in costs being over 45 percent higher than production 
costs under vertical arrangements. 
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3 Contracts in Decentralised Electricity Systems 
In this section we explain and elaborate on the problems that occur in contracts-
based electricity markets, identifying why the “traditional” view of appropriate sector 
structure may fail to produce desired sector outcomes in practice. Reasons for this failure 
include hold-up risks, adverse selection risks due to market power and asymmetric 
information, contract market illiquidity (due to features inherent in both electricity 
systems and electricity markets), and mismatches between generators and retailers in 
terms of preferred load profiles and relative risk aversion. Initial conditions are also 
emphasised, in terms of contracts, vertical integration or excess generating capacity at the 
commencement of decentralisation. 
 
3.1 Expected Role of  Contracts 
 
The “textbook” model of electricity sector liberalisation holds that vertical and 
horizontal integration across all parts of the system – generation, transmission, 
distribution and retailing – is not a necessary form of organisation. In particular, while 
transmission and distribution retain “natural monopoly” features that limit their 
contestability, it is possible to introduce welfare-enhancing competition across generation 
and retailing. Doing so requires the vertical separation of generation, retailing and the 
non-competitive network activities, horizontal unbundling of otherwise unnecessarily 
monopolistic generation, and non-discriminatory access to network assets to facilitate 
competitive entry of generators and/or retailers. To facilitate transparent and competitive 
price discovery, some form of wholesale market is required, whether it takes the form of 
a centralised pool or bilateral trading, energy only spot markets or a range of real time 
and forward (including day-ahead) energy and capacity markets. 
Such changes have been facilitated by reductions in the minimum efficient scale 
of generation technologies, as well as improved control technologies that enable the 
coordination of decentralised electricity components to maintain system reliability in the 
face of electricity’s particular requirement for real time balance of supply and demand, 
given that electricity cannot be economically stored. While the separation of activities 
that were formerly tightly coordinated involves lost economies of scale and scope, the 
combination of improved technologies and greater competition between generators and 
retailers is predicted to provide greater, offsetting gains. 
As noted by Chao et al. (2005) and Finon and Perez (2008), the drive towards 
vertical separation and market-based competition was predicated on two key 
assumptions. First was that contracts markets, complemented by spot markets, would 
naturally develop (or could be sustainably imposed) to replace the former vertical 
integration arrangements, as illustrated in Figure 2 (overleaf). Second was the assumption 
that generators would be able to raise capital to fund new investments without the 
security of cost recovery (whether via cost of service regulation or private utilities in the 
US, or through consumer franchises and taxpayer guarantees in state-owned systems 
such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand). 
As to the first assumption, of particular importance is contracting between 
generators and either large customers or energy retailers which aggregate portfolios of 
smaller customers. Assuming liquid physical and financial markets for such contracts are 
developed over a suitable range of contract horizons and contract types, then a number 
of benefits could be expected to flow. Large customers would be able to hedge their 
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electricity price risks through direct purchases of wholesale contracts tailored to match 
their load profile, and rely on their scale to counter-veil against any market power held by 
oligopolistic generators. Retailers would be able to reduce their exposure to demand 
uncertainty by pooling numerous smaller customer loads, and run a portfolio of supply 
contracts to match the risk characteristics and profile of that pooled load.  
 
Figure 2: Contracting in Stylised Decentralised Electricity Systems 
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Moreover, a liquid contracts market, supported by institutional changes to ensure 
retail customer contestability (e.g. switching rules), should enable the competitive entry of 
retailers, thereby ensuring competitive pressure is placed on retail margins. The ability of 
entrant generation to trade through a spot market or other contracts markets similarly 
introduces the prospect of increased competition in wholesale prices. Finally, generators 
making new investments should be able to secure their investment returns by entering 
into suitable long-term contracts with one or more parties, which should go some way 
towards satisfying the second of the key assumptions underlying liberalisation.  
 
3.2 The Experience of  Contracting 
 
Experience in many countries has not lived up to the predictions that 
liberalisation would lead to increased competition in wholesale and retail markets, the 
emergence of a range of contractual forms to support long-term investment, and better 
sector outcomes (in terms of generation adequacy and lower prices). Firstly, retail entry 
has not eventuated as expected, despite entry by start-up independent electricity retailers, 
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diversifying gas retailers, and incumbent electricity retailers from other regions 
(Defeuilley (2008)). Even at their peak in 1999-2001 the independent retailers were 
unable to secure more than a 2% market share in the UK, for example, which along with 
Norway and Sweden was one of the more vibrant retail markets. Such firms proved to be 
unable to secure adequate physical and financial contracts to hedge their exposure to 
wholesale electricity prices, and the remaining independent firms have found it necessary 
to integrate upstream with generation to survive. Conversely, other entrants have been 
able to continue, in part due to their own vertical or horizontal integration (for example, 
into electricity from gas, as illustrated by Centrica in the UK, the former gas utility that is 
now the only major electricity retailer without generation interests). 
Similarly, expectations in generation have not been met: investors appear to have 
become more wary, despite initial post-reform enthusiasm, and long-term contracts have 
not developed or performed to the satisfaction of project financiers. Joskow (2006) 
records that significant investment arose in the US when generation was opened to 
competition. In the 1980s independent power producers were able to project finance 
new generation (typically gas-fired CCGT) using high debt levels on the strength of 
supply contracts written with utilities that retained some measure of customer franchise. 
In the 1990s such project financing of merchant generation continued, but without 
contracting. Instead, reliance was placed on (at that time) high wholesale prices to finance 
investments, to the detriment of many entrants when wholesale prices fell and gas prices 
rose. The resulting bankruptcies and withdrawal of merchant generation in the US – 
notably California in 2001 – has been reflected in similar experiences in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe. While the UK’s “dash to gas” in the 1990s resulted in significant 
new CCGT investment supported by 15 year supply contracts with retailers who retained 
some measure of retail franchise, failures also resulted there when wholesale prices fell 
following the 2002 introduction of NETA. Consequently financiers of new generation 
investments now demand highly creditworthy output contracts as a condition of funding 
arrangements. Aside from such examples of financial distress Joskow highlights the 
additional “missing money” problem plaguing many systems – in which average 
electricity prices – even when capacity mechanism payments are considered – are 
inadequate to fund new investment. He attributes such problems to features of electricity 
market design and operation, such as system operator discretions over managing 
operating reserves, price-inelastic demand, and wholesale price caps. 
More in line with predictions, contract markets have developed to a significant 
degree in a number of electricity systems (Chao et al. (2005), Anderson et al. (2006), 
Finon and Perez (2008)). Among these are the UK and Australia’s east coast National 
Electricity Market (NEM). In both cases generation was unbundled and/or privatised 
with long-term vesting contracts in place to smooth the transition to competitive 
markets, providing both price certainty and constraints on remaining generator market 
power. In the UK this was further reinforced by the radical restructuring of the 
centralised wholesale “pool” in England and Wales and its replacement with NETA in 
2002, relying as it does almost exclusively on bilateral contracting and only a limited 
centralised real time balancing market. By contrast contract markets developed 
organically in Scandinavia’s NordPool and in Germany, driven by grid companies and 
utilities respectively. 
Where contract markets have developed, however, they have not developed to 
the extent envisaged. Anderson et al. (2006) report that base load generators in the NEM 
are 70-80% hedged on average, which compares with 95% in the UK, around 80% in the 
US’ PJM and New Zealand systems, and 73% in New England. Moreover, trading 
volumes can be substantial – up to 4-5 times physical demand (HMDSG (2005)). 
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However, Anderson et al. report that most NEM contracts are typically for less than four 
years duration, mirroring the experience in the US and New Zealand where contract 
duration is usually no more than three years (Chao et al. (2005), Hansen (2004)). 
Similarly, low contract durations are reported for the UK, where most trades are for one 
year only (HMDSG (2005)). Moreover, contract volumes can also be small, with trades in 
New Zealand representing around just 25% of total demand (Electricity Commission 
(2008)). 
Furthermore, even where contract markets have developed to a significant 
degree, and more so where they have not (e.g. New Zealand), vertical integration has 
increasingly arisen. Examples include the UK, Australia, EU and New Zealand. In the 
NEM, Simhauser (2008) attributes a trend towards vertical integration to a combination 
of factors, including the initial mix and level of of base load and peaking generation. Like 
many liberalising systems the NEM began with a surplus of generation capacity. This 
surplus depressed prices, resulting in falling generation capacity and peaking plant 
investment. Falling generation in turn reduced the supply of contracts, which combined 
with a doubling in the regulated wholesale price cap to create a “domino effect” as 
retailers invested upstream in generation to some degree (especially in peaking and 
intermediate plant).  
In New Zealand vertical integration quickly arose as an unintended consequence 
of simultaneous reforms in 1999 (Evans and Meade (2005), Meade (2005), Hansen 
(2004)). At the same time that the dominant generator was horizontally unbundled into 
competing companies, former restrictions on integration between generation and 
retailing were lifted. This coincided with other reforms requiring the ownership 
separation of retailing and distribution, resulting in the rapid downstream integration by 
generators into retailing. This structure was finally cemented in 2001, when a winter 
supply crisis resulted in soaring wholesale electricity prices, before which the largest non-
integrated retailer NGC had opted not to renew hedge contracts. With retail customers 
on fixed prices NGC faced a severe price squeeze, quickly lost over NZ$300m, and 
consequently sold its retail base to generators. This move was reinforced by limited 
contract market development in the lead up to the 1999 reforms – in part a consequence 
of flaws in how contracting requirements had been imposed on the dominant generator 
(Hansen (2004)). 
 
3.3 Why Contracts Haven’t Developed as Anticipated 
 
3.3.1 The Nature of the Contracting Problem in Electricity 
 
While the mitigation of generator market power has often been proposed as an 
important role of contracts (e.g. Allaz and Villa (1993), though contrast Newbery (1998)), 
in practise risk management has proven to be the dominant purpose (Chao et al. (2005), 
Anderson et al. (2006), Finon and Perez (2008)). Risk management in turn is important 
for facilitating financing and investment, which has implications for supply security, and 
more fundamentally for business survival (an issue receiving greater focus in the light of 
prominent failures). Risk management by electricity operators is also important at a 
political level, in terms of business survival, supply security and price stability, since 
failures to achieve any of these increases the risk of large customer or voter backlash. In 
turn this affects the viability of decentralised electricity systems, with associated 
interventions such as wholesale price caps, state buying of contracts (e.g. California) or 
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reserve generation requirements likely to distort incentives for generation and other 
investments (Joskow (2006), Meade (2005)). 
Generators face both price and quantity risks in their output and input markets. 
While risks regarding the price or quantity of capital inputs are amenable to risk 
management in most developed capital markets (financial crises aside), the same is not 
always true for other inputs. Supply or price insecurity for gas, such as that in the UK 
with declining North Sea reserves or other European countries reliant on gas from 
Russia, create one set of risks. Similar risks arise for hydro generators exposed to variable 
inflows, storage constraints, and possible environmental regulation affecting off-take (as 
is the case in New Zealand – Evans and Meade (2005)). Uncertainty about plant 
availability creates additional input risk. On the output side generators face highly 
variable real time demand, as well as daily and seasonal load variations that may not align 
well with capacity. Real time demand variability can be especially costly where plant is 
costly or slow to “ramp up”, such as for coal generation.9 Moreover, given highly price-
inelastic demand in the short-term, small changes in plant availability or demand shifts 
(e.g. due to weather changes) can result in highly volatile prices. These features can be 
exacerbated in systems with transmission constraints and locational pricing (such as PJM 
and New Zealand), since transmission system operators can “constrain off” or “constrain 
on” generation to maintain system stability, and significant spatial price separation can 
therefore result. 
Similarly, retailers face price and quantity risks in wholesale and retail markets. 
They too face input quantity risk, especially where generators are input constrained (such 
as in hydro systems like New Zealand’s with limited reserves) or have plant prone to 
outages (e.g. thermal). Such risks also correlate with price risks – often demand is highest 
in electricity systems precisely when prices are also highest (Chao et al. (2005), Meade 
(2003)), resulting in highly convex costs. Such convexity is shown to be an important 
rationale for hedging (Mackay and Moeller (2007)). On their output side retailers face 
relatively less price risk, in that smaller customers tend to have a clear preference for 
fixed price contracts. While this exposes retailers to price squeezes if they do not have 
hedged supplies, in principle they can reduce this risk with appropriate contracts. Like 
generators, however, retailers remain exposed to real time demand variability, and hence 
can be exposed to uncertain spot prices if their contract positions are inadequate. 
Large customers, by contrast, face price and quantity risk in their output markets 
that is less correlated with that of retailers. Moreover, except for aluminium smelters, 
steel mills and other firms for which electricity costs are a significant part of their overall 
cost structure, large customers are not exposed to input price risks to the same degree as 
retailers (for whom energy costs are by far the biggest cost). They remain exposed to 
some degree, however, to price and quantity volatility in wholesale electricity markets, 
which affects their need and preference for hedging arrangements. Even when electricity 
costs are a small part of their overall costs, a secure electricity supply can be essential for 
their business viability, and hence hedging quantity risks (i.e. securing supply) may matter 
more to them than hedging price risks. 
In terms of hedging short-term exposure to price or quantity risks, generators 
and retailers (and to a lesser extent large customers) are in principle natural counter-
parties. By entering into hedge contracts they can lock in some part of their desired 
demand or assured supply, and at prices that need not be tied to volatile wholesale 
                                                 
9  Wolak (2007) shows how a generator can reduce ramping costs and increase profit while accepting a lower average 
output price by smoothing its output through the use of a forward contract. 
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market prices. Retailers with spiking demand and fixed price customers will not wish to 
be exposed to spot market prices for top-ups; whereas generators will not wish to over-
commit supply and be forced to purchase at spot prices to make up supply shortfalls. 
Consequently generators cannot afford to be over-contracted, whereas retailers cannot 
afford to be under-contracted, possibly creating an overlapping set of contracting 
preferences. Furthermore there is a natural role for generators that have uncorrelated 
input or output risks to contract among themselves rather than to bear the risk of having 
to trade in spot markets to make up supply shortfalls when over-committed, or sell 
surplus when under-committed. In that way they can hedge themselves against 
unforeseen plant outages, input shortages or input price hikes. This in turn enables them 
to issue contracts to retailers and generators over a larger share of their capacity without 
risking an unhedged exposure. 
Large customers and retailers also share some ability to use contracting as a 
device to constrain generator market power. As mentioned above, requiring generators to 
commit some part of their capacity via fixed price contracts reduces their incentive to 
exercise market power, which is one reason why generation privatisations have 
sometimes involved vesting contracts. Contracting can be used by large customers or 
organised customer groups, however, as a more proactive tool to address market power 
concerns, sometimes in lieu of explicit regulation.10 
In terms of supply security it might be thought that generators and retailers (or 
large customers) will share incentives to contract. Where common security obligations 
are imposed on all parties this might be so, but common pool resource (i.e. non-
excludable but rivalrous) attributes of supply security do not ensure this if free rider 
problems are severe.11 
 
3.3.2 Factors Undermining the Effectiveness of Contracting 
 
Hold-Up Risks 
A fundamental issue in using contracts to support generation investment is the 
divergence of the parties’ preferred contracting horizons in most instances. The 
generation investments required for supply security are usually large, sunk and long-lived, 
creating a preference for generators, their funders and possibly fuel suppliers to secure 
investment returns for commensurately long periods. Entry costs in retailing are low by 
contrast, as are the costs of smaller customers changing their supplier. This exposes 
retailing firms to the risk of losing market share to new entrants if they fix their input 
costs by hedge contracts for any sustained period in which spot or contract prices then 
fall, inducing entry. In such instances retailers may either fail, or otherwise renege on 
their contract positions, stranding their generator counterparties. 
Anticipating such classic hold-up problems by retailers exposed to retail 
predation, generators offer less contracts than they would otherwise prefer to offer. Not 
only does this increase their incentive to exploit market power in wholesale markets by 
increasing wholesale prices (Green (2004)) – thus making contracting potentially less 
attractive to retailers – but it also reduces the level of investment they can secure against 
supply contracts, and creates the additional risk of reduced supply security. If such hold-
                                                 
10  See Glachant et al. (2008) for a discussion of the German electricity sector model. 
11  See Meade (2005) for a discussion. 
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up is sufficiently severe then generators too might find themselves financially at risk, and 
hence possibly renege on their own upstream contracts (e.g. with fuel suppliers). This is 
less an issue where generators are already integrated upstream with fuel supplies (such as 
coal-fired or hydro stations), but may give rise to cascading hold-up risks with gas or 
uranium suppliers which have their own large, long-lived and sunk investments. If this 
should result in sub-optimal upstream investments in exploration, extraction or 
transmission, this can serve to exacerbate the fuel and quantity squeeze risks faced by 
generators, resulting in reduced investment and supply security, and reduced contracting. 
This hold-up risk also arises in respect of large customers that contract with 
generators. Where those customers enjoy market power in their own output markets they 
are at less risk of losing market share to competitors if they should happen to enter into 
electricity contracts at prices that prove to be too high. However large customers with 
competitive output markets may face hold-up risks that in turn induce them to 
potentially renege on their contracts with generators, thus reducing the supply of 
contracts, raising wholesale prices, and reducing investment and supply security. Long-
lived investments that were made pre-liberalisation are vulnerable to being politically 
held-up by the reform process itself, particularly when it involves an unanticipated shift 
from regulated and smooth pricing (amenable to political lobbying) to volatile or 
increased prices set by market processes (less amenable to political control). Indeed, 
Anderson et al. (2006) report that participants in the NEM regard regulatory risk and 
ongoing reforms as their single greatest risk. If this is the case, then large customers that 
operate in competitive markets, and that are in a position where electricity price or supply 
security risks affect their ability to meet customer supply security and price requirements, 
face the risk of being out-competed by rivals that do not share those risks. Hence 
industrial structure has some capacity to influence hold-up risks in generation. 
Both retailers and large customers also face the risk of being held up by 
generators, for example when replacing expiring hedge contracts. For large industrial 
customers at least this may pose the greater risk than the hold-up risk they pose for 
generators, particularly if they operate in competitive output markets. This is because any 
given industrial customer may account for a fraction of a generator’s output, whereas any 
given generator may account for a large share of their supply. However, if a secure 
electricity supply at a competitive price is important for the ongoing competitiveness of 
industrial customers (e.g. aluminium smelters) then the location of their plant would 
presumably have been decided on the strength of the long-term electricity supply 
contracts they could negotiate at the outset, which reduces their exposure to generator 
hold-up.  
For the reasons discussed above the problem is more finely balanced for retailers. 
For incumbent retailers the reform process itself creates its own hold-up problems, 
whereas entrant generators have the benefit of determining whether reformed market 
conditions enable economic entry. In each case the incentive for retailers not to contract 
for more than a few years has to be balanced against the benefits they might enjoy by 
securing longer-term contracts with generators.  
Where the balance of risks lies – i.e. whether generators or retailers face the 
greater risk of being held up by the other – reflects a wider consideration in this analysis. 
Specifically, hold-up risks are most pronounced where either party has undiversified 
positions. For example, a generator with geographically dispersed plant and a mixture of 
fuel types is less exposed to quantity squeezes than a merchant generator with a single 
plant. Moreover, a generator with a portfolio of supply contracts combining a mixture of 
loads can smooth out demand volatility that both reduces quantity squeezes and also its 
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exposure to hold-up by any one customer. Facing a smoother load profile means it is also 
able to write contracts over a greater share of its capacity, all fuel and other supply risks 
being equal. Similarly, retailers with a portfolio of supply contracts for different 
maturities and/or from different generators diversify their exposure to hold-up by any 
one generator. A merchant generator with a single off-take agreement or a retailer with a 
single supply agreement is clearly in a more vulnerable position. 
 
Adverse Selection Risk due to Market Power and Asymmetric Information 
Generator market power and information asymmetries can conspire to create 
adverse selection problems for retailing firms and large customers which further reduce 
their willingness to lock themselves into long-term contracts, particularly if contract 
prices are temporarily high (e.g. as in the lead-up to peak demand periods in New 
Zealand when hydro storage is low). Aside from the general difficulty in predicting 
supply and demand conditions more than a few years out (Anderson et al. (2006)) – an 
example of bounded rationality that hinders effective contracting – these parties can be 
reluctant to contract with generators whom they believe to possess market power, as well 
as better knowledge than they about impending outages or fuel insecurity. Where 
contract prices are perceived to be neither competitive nor reliable then this only 
increases the risk that they enter into a contract price and then face being out-competed 
in fixed price retail markets by competing retailers (or in product markets by competing 
industrials) who can secure more favourable prices through either superior information 
or greater negotiating leverage. 
 
Market Illiquidity 
This adverse selection problem, leading to generator hold-up risks, is only made 
worse by the general problem of illiquid forward markets for which standard arbitrage 
pricing conditions do not hold. Since electricity is not economically storable, contracts 
for forward delivery of different maturities are effectively contracts for distinct 
commodities – energy at defined future times. This thins the relevant markets – 
exacerbating potential market power issues – and means temporal hedge markets do not 
satisfy arbitrage relations based on storage costs. Arbitrage is made even more difficult in 
systems with transmission capacity auctions (such system residue auctions for 
interconnector congestion rents in the NEM, interconnector capacity auctions in the EU, 
or FTR auctions), due to asynchronous energy and transmission auctions (Anderson et 
al. (2006)). Additionally, the delivery of electricity has a spatial dimension in systems with 
transmission constraints and either zonal or nodal pricing, which further thins the 
relevant forward markets. 
 
Outages, Fuel Risk and Load Profiles 
Generators exposed to significant input risk will prefer force majeure or other 
availability clauses that do not commit them to supply during outages or fuel shortages. 
Retailers or industrial customers may be prepared to accept such clauses if generation is 
constrained and contracts are in short supply, but in general they will prefer contracts 
that follow their own load profile and demand swings, rather than generator supply 
availabilities. They will also prefer asymmetric instruments such as options which limit 
both their quantity and price risks, which generators will not prefer. Hence, while supply 
and demand preferences may align – such as aluminium smelters contracting with base 
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load generators, or retailers hedging peak demands by contracting with peak generators – 
any divergence of preferences limits the standardisation of hedge contracts and thus 
reduces the liquidity of hedge markets. Indeed, generators preferring continuous supply 
are likely to seek a premium if they are to be induced to commit some of their output to 
supply an uneven load. Conversely, generators with seasonal (e.g. run of river hydro) or 
other temporal supply patterns will prefer contracts that align with those patterns, and 
will also seek a premium to write contracts that do so poorly.  Writing contracts that do 
not align with their supply profiles leaves generators with uncommitted supply that may 
be harder to contract. Both sides to a contract will therefore need to weigh whether their 
interests are better served by contracting at a price, or to only contract to a more limited 
extent so that residual contracting options are preserved (especially when demand or 
supply conditions are particularly volatile). 
 
Relative Risk Aversion 
Misalignment of contracting preferences is exacerbated by differences in relative 
risk aversion between the parties. For example, Anderson et al. (2006) report that state-
owned generators in the NEM are more risk averse than private generators. This may 
bias them in favour of greater contracting relative to private generators, but also increases 
their preference for contracts that do not commit them to supply during outages or fuel 
shortages. Private generators by contrast may be less inclined to issue contracts (all other 
things being equal), but be more prepared to offer terms favouring customers who do 
not wish to bear outage risk. Depending on the fuel type and variety of private and state-
owned generators, such differences in risk preferences could create distinct sub-markets 
for contracts.  
Contracting problems become more severe if generators have market power and 
are also less risk averse than retailers and large customers. Such a reduced level of risk 
aversion could reflect soft budget constraints in the case of state-owned generators, or 
the possibility that generators’ input and output risks are to a greater extent off-setting 
than those faced by their customers. In this case generators have less incentive to write 
contracts for two reasons – first they do not wish to reduce their ability to increase 
prices, and second they have less need to hedge in the first place. This does not mean 
that they will offer no contracts, but rather that contract prices will be higher, contract 
volumes will be lower and contract terms will be less favourable than if generators did 
not enjoy market power or have relatively low risk aversion. 
 
Initial Conditions 
The success or dominance of contracting as a governance device for managing 
risks in liberalising electricity systems also reflects the initial conditions at the 
commencement of reforms. Where decentralised systems emerge against a backdrop of 
significant excess capacity, for example, generators will be more likely to offer contracts 
for sale and to do so on more favourable terms (e.g. with less protective force majeure 
clauses or better demand load matching) than if this were not the case. In the same 
circumstances, however, retailers or large customers face less imperative to sign such 
contracts, and indeed may prefer not to do given that prices will already be relatively low. 
As demand grows and excess capacity diminishes, the supply of contracts may shrink at 
the same time that customers increasingly prefer to hedge against future price rises, 
unless large customers (for example) are prepared to contract forward to secure 
investments offering them greater security of supply. Such forward contracting is 
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facilitated where those customers enjoy some degree of market power in their output 
markets, or their competitors are also locked into the contracts (e.g. via joint venture). 
The extent of pre-existing vertical integration or long-term contracts also plays a 
role. While vesting contracts are often imposed on dominant generators as a means to 
constrain their market power as liberalisation unfolds, even in horizontally de-integrated 
systems pre-existing contracts or vertical integration affect the supply of and demand for 
contracts. Systems with large industrial customers on long-term contracts signed pre-
liberalisation often inherit those contracts as states seek to mirror their commitments in a 
way that does not crystallise or reveal liabilities to taxpayers. A consequence of this, 
however, is that the evolution of contracts markets will necessarily be constrained by the 
scope and terms of such contracts. Similarly, vertical integration, with large customers or 
otherwise, will also affect contract market evolution since the supply of and demand for 
contracts will be lower, and hence contract markets less liquid, if significant vertical 
integration already exists.  
 
With these limitations of contracting in mind, we now turn to the merits of 
vertical integration as an alternative, and also consider some possible fixes to the 
problems of contracting for risk management in decentralised electricity systems. 
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4 Remedying the Contracting Problems – Vertical 
Integration and Alternatives 
 
This section argues that vertical integration – supported to some degree by spot and 
longer-term contract markets – is a more natural and self-sustaining approach to risk-
management in decentralised electricity systems. As a consequence it offers benefits over 
contracting in additional areas such as investment and security of supply. The section 
begins with a general discussion of the benefits of integration, and then considers 
instances in which particular cases of upstream and downstream integration are to be 
preferred. Finally, alternative approaches to vertical integration – which involve directly 
addressing the failures of contracting in electricity systems – are considered. These 
include regulating for contracts, reducing retail-level competition, and various demand-
side fixes. Apart from the latter, these alternatives are argued to be unnecessary, counter-
productive, excessive or otherwise inferior, in general, to or in the presence of vertical 
integration.   
 
4.1 Vertical Integration 
 
4.1.1 General Advantages Relative to Contracting 
 
Internalising Costs and Risks 
In Section 2 we argued that vertical integration internalises a range of costs (and 
risks) within the firm that otherwise must be managed through contracting. It is 
preferable to do so when the costs of contracting exceed the costs of internal 
organisation. Section 3 identifies the particular costs of contracting in decentralised 
electricity systems – many of which result from mismatches between generators and 
retailers. These include mismatches in input and output volatility, asset specificity, 
investment horizons, information about supply and demand, degree of diversification 
and market power. They also arise due to regulatory risks. Because of these, contracts 
have inherent limitations that hinder the achievement of their fundamental purpose – the 
management of price and quantity risks.  
Whether customers integrate upstream into generation or vice versa, either way 
wholesale price risks become largely moot. If wholesale prices are too high then one part 
of the firm gains while the other loses. Since the role of contracting under vertical 
integration is reduced to covering only any remaining uncommitted (or over-committed) 
capacity, wholesale prices play a much reduced role, and hence any volatility in wholesale 
prices similarly is of less consequence in the firm’s objective function. Indeed, while spot 
market prices typically allow recovery of only short-run marginal production costs, 
integrated firms are concerned more with the recovery of long-run average costs, going 
some way towards addressing the “missing money” problem identified in Joskow (2006), 
and therefore supporting investment and supply security. Figure 3 illustrates how 
integration changes firm boundaries so as to reduce or eliminate the role of wholesale 
electricity prices otherwise faced via contracting. 
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Figure 3: Internalising Wholesale Prices via Vertical Integration 
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 Better Long-Term Matching of Capacity and Load 
Vertical integration also provides a long-term match between generator and 
customer preferences in terms of supply-security and load matching. Retailers fearful of 
short-term wholesale price spikes for which durable contracting arrangements are not 
available can invest in peaking plant. Large customers with unusual or seasonal load 
profiles (e.g. dairy processors or pulp and paper processors) can invest in co-generation 
plant with output that correlates with their production patterns and that also affords 
them greater control over their achieved level of supply security. Conversely, generators 
with diversified plant can not only hedge their input price and quantity risks, but by 
having a smoother supply profile they are better placed to integrate with a diversified 
customer base. Such diversification presents the generator with a less variable load 
profile, but also reduces the generator’s exposure to the loss of any particular large 
customer, or group of customers. In other words, for any given level of retail entry risk 
(or output market competition for large customers), diversified and integrated firms are 
less exposed to the hold-up risk arising with non-integrated customers.  
The combined effect of marginalising the integrated firm’s exposure to wholesale 
price risk, and enabling a better matching of capacity and demand characteristics, means 
that vertical integration more effectively manages wholesale price risks than does 
contracting. Moreover, it does this on a secure long-term basis, whereas contracting 
achieves effective risk management – to the extent it does – only for the contract 
horizon, which in practice is for only a limited period. Beyond that horizon contracting 
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parties are exposed to renegotiation risks not shared by integrated firms. Internalising the 
limited wholesale price risks to the firm thus provides a more durable hedge. 
 
Reduced Market Power and Regulation Risks 
Furthermore, just as contracts reduce the incentive for generators to exercise 
market power, so too does integration, with the benefits of integration for wholesale 
prices being tied to the degree of balance between generation and retailing activities, not 
the degree of generator market power per se (Hogan and Meade (2007)). Hence, while 
vertical integration thins the markets for contracts, it has the positive externality that it 
reduces the problems of generator market power, and also asymmetric information and 
strategic bargaining, that otherwise would be commonplace in contract markets. 
Generators face less incentive to exploit any short-term informational or bargaining 
advantages they may hold when the bulk of their output is already committed to their 
integrated customers. 
On the other hand, integration also creates information asymmetries that further 
benefit the integrated firm and support investment. Specifically, by internalising 
wholesale prices to the integrated firm, such prices become a less reliable signal to 
regulators and policy makers regarding firm conduct and reform success. Rising, spiking 
or highly volatile wholesale prices can give rise to calls for greater regulatory intervention, 
such as wholesale price caps. However, with integration the case for such intervention is 
reduced, as is its impact. The case is weaker because integrated generators with balanced 
portfolios have less incentive to exercise wholesale market power, and if customers are 
on fixed price contracts offered by integrated generators then they are insulated from 
wholesale price movements anyway. The impact of price regulation is weaker (relative to 
the impact on non-integrated firms) because wholesale prices are relevant to integrated 
firms only at the margin – so it is only at the margin that any regulatory costs or benefits 
would accrue. Furthermore, an integrated firm’s more important decision variables – 
such as fuel stocks and average production costs – are not known to regulators, further 
complicating any attempt to regulate it. Thus vertical integration provides a natural hedge 
against regulatory intervention. 
 
Reduced Hold-Up Risk 
Importantly, vertical integration fundamentally reduces the risk of hold-up that 
can plague non-integrated electricity systems reliant on contracting. As discussed in 
Section 3, hold-up risk originates with the risk of competitive entry in retailing (or 
product market competition for large customers), and then cascades upstream into 
generation, and beyond that to fuel and capital supplies. By thinning contract markets 
vertical integration immediately reduces the scope for retail entry, since any new entrant 
of scale would need to also invest in generation capacity. This requirement for joint 
investment in both retailing and generation significantly raises entry costs for potential 
entrants, thus deterring entry and hence hold-up risk.  
Simultaneously, even if retail entrants were not required to invest in generation, 
the fact that they can access only reduced contract capacity means any existing scale 
mismatches between retailers and generators are emphasised. Generators are often much 
larger than retailers, meaning that competitive entry by a non-integrated retailer will only 
vie for some portion of the customer base of an integrated generator. This automatically 
reduces the generator’s exposure to hold-up and failure, should the entrant retailer 
succeed. However, the integrated generator needs only to ensure it can recover long-run 
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average costs to ensure its survival against entry. Hence even if it matches the entrant’s 
prices for its at-risk customer classes it may still remain viable, particularly if it relies on 
more modest debt financing rather than highly-leveraged project financing. Moreover, in 
principle it can cross-subsidise at-risk customer classes using any non-at risk customers, 
further ensuring its financial viability in the face of entry. Indeed, integrated firms are 
potentially further insulated from hold-up risk if these scale mis-matches are increased 
when contract markets are thinned by integration. 
 
The Virtue of Transmission Constraints 
The advantage of vertical integration over contracting in terms of reduced hold-
up risk can also arise from an unexpected quarter – transmission constraints. In systems 
such as the UK’s where there are relatively few transmission constraints national energy 
prices and postage stamp transmission charges are supported. In turn this facilitates retail 
entry and hence hold-up risk at a national level. By contrast, in systems such as New 
Zealand’s with significant transmission constraints and locational energy pricing 
reflecting transmission constraint and loss rentals, retail competition is often more 
regionally defined. This is because transmission constraints can result in significant and 
often unpredictable price separation between pricing nodes (i.e. grid injection and exit 
points). In the absence of tools to mitigate the risks to generators and customers of such 
price separation – such as financial transmission rights or the NEM’s system residual 
auctions – such price separation can expose either generators or customers to the risk of 
significant under-hedging via contracts. In New Zealand, for example, energy hedge 
contracts are often available only for key reference nodes, and significant price separation 
can occur between those nodes and others. Hence if any party seeks to hedge its price 
risk at other than these reference nodes using contracts it cannot do so in respect of 
congestion rents and transmission losses, unless it has physical hedges above or below 
the relevant constraints. 
Since nodal electricity systems with grid constraints can be electrically balkanised, 
this presents natural barriers to non-integrated retail entry. Such barriers are made worse 
when integrated generators also operate in the same “regionalised” sub-system of the 
grid. While non-integrated retailers reliant on contracting are at risk of nodal price 
separation, limiting their ability to align supply costs and output prices, integrated 
generators may have plant above and below constraints which provides them with the 
required physical hedge against price separation. Indeed, it is also possible for generators 
with plant either side of a constraint to game the constraint so that it becomes binding 
with the result that competing retailers are exposed to price separation, while its own 
plant downstream of the constraint is dispatched at a higher price.12 In an apparently 
perverse way such electrical fiefdoms created by grid constraints protect integrated 
generators with spatially dispersed capacity against excessive retail competition.  
Hence, just as encouraging retail competition may have the unintended 
consequence of worsening hold-up risk, limiting investment and creating supply 
insecurity, so too might moves to introduce greater wholesale competition through 
removing grid constraints, or introducing mechanisms such as FTRs for market 
participants to hedge their exposure to congestion rents and transmission losses. Indeed, 
while introducing greater generator competition in wholesale markets is often the 
                                                 
12  For a discussion of such gaming in the context of an evaluation of a FTR proposal for New Zealand see Evans 
and Meade (2001). 
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primary driver of reducing transmission constraints, this objective becomes moot 
provided generators are integrated and have balance between capacity and load (since, 
then, incentives to exercise wholesale market power are reduced). Hence, given any level 
of retail competition, the possible benefits of grid constraints in terms of reduced hold-
up risk require consideration. 
 
Investment Benefits of Fuel Uncertainty in Hydro-Based Systems 
In a similar vein, electricity systems in which fuel uncertainty can result in 
sustained electricity price rises may also benefit generation investment. While demand 
spikes, grid failures or generation outages can cause transitory surges in wholesale 
electricity prices, systems in which hydro storage is limited or uncertain can sustain such 
surges – sometimes for months. Such hydro limitations contributed to the NordPool 
spike of 2002-03, as well as the Californian crisis of 2000-01 (Amundsen and Bergman 
(2006)). They have also been a regular cause of significant and sustained wholesale price 
rises in New Zealand in the “dry winters” of 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008, as illustrated in 
Figure 4 (overleaf).13 New Zealand has winter-peaking demand (for heating rather than 
summer cooling), as well as volatile hydro inflows and limited hydro storage.The fact that 
60-65% of generation capacity is hydro-based means the system is therefore highly 
vulnerable to poor hydro inflows to its storage system. 
As can be seen, there is a significant correlation between wholesale price rises and 
negative hydro balances. There are also sustained periods in which tight hydro balance 
and strong winter demand (largely weather-dependent) result in wholesale prices many 
times average levels (though nowhere near the peaks experienced in other – 
interconnected – systems). Importantly, such systemic and sustained price rises are not 
amenable to short-term politically-motivated responses such as price caps, since they 
could materially distort generator incentives to supply precisely when they are needed to 
most. In turn that would worsen supply security and result in even higher political costs 
than those arising under high wholesale prices (which affect large industrial customers if 
they do not have adequate hedge contracts, but which only slowly feed through to 
increases in otherwise fixed prices for smaller customers). 
Consequently such hydro-based systems can produce significant “scarcity rents” 
to support new generation investment. While the wholesale price rises can be (and are) 
often attributed to abuse of generator market power, they can also arise for benign 
reasons such as a significantly increased opportunity cost of water and the associated real 
options value from deferring generation (so as to preserve scarce hydro resources for 
possible increases in future demand – e.g. Amundsen and Bergman (2006), Evans and 
Guthrie (2007)). Thus such systems may be more immune to the “missing money” 
problem referred to by Joskow (2006), and consequently better able to support 
generation investment. 
As discussed in Section 3, generators’ exposure to fuel uncertainty complicates 
contracting in electricity systems. Where such uncertainty is systemic and potentially 
prolonged, generators will naturally incline towards contracts with force majeure clauses 
that protect them against contract breach in the event of non-delivery. In precisely the 
same situations, however, large customers and retailers would prefer to not face such 
clauses, unless they have significant ability to curtail load. In vertically integrated systems, 
                                                 
13  For a discussion of the 2001 and 2003 winter “crises”, and a comparison with earlier New Zealand experience with 
supply constraints, see Evans and Meade (2005). 
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by contrast, these risks are internalised to generators, and increases in fixed retail prices 
(and hedge contract prices) following sustained increases in wholesale prices therefore 
support new generation investments. 
 
Figure 4: Wholesale Price Rises and Hydro Balance in New Zealand 
 
 
Source: Data courtesy of M-Co. 
 
Favourable Comparative Ownership Costs 
Thus far the arguments in favour of vertical integration have focused on 
contracting cost savings. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, vertical 
integration is to be preferred to contracting only if contracting costs outweigh the costs 
of internal organisation. It is possible, however, that vertical integration involves both 
contracting cost and internal organisation cost savings, meaning it dominates contracting 
as a form of governance. This view is reinforced by the fact that vertical integration is 
becoming either the dominant or an increasingly prominent governance mode in both 
systems without significant contract markets (e.g. New Zealand – see Meade (2005), 
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Hansen (2004)), or those with relatively liquid contract markets (e.g. Australia – see 
Simhauser (2008), Anderson et al. (2006), Chester (2006) – and the UK – see Pollit 
(2007), Thomas (2004), Roques et al. (2005)). Contracts, by contrast, are often an 
imposition of liberalisation processes, or artefacts of historical arrangements (e.g. long-
term state contracts with large industrial firms). Hence they possibly represent a 
dominated governance form arising exogenously (e.g. reflecting wider political 
constraints) rather than as an endogenously-determined institutional form. 
The case in favour of upstream integration into generation by individual or 
groups of large industrial customers appears relatively straightforward. Particularly when 
such integration involves use of co-generation, such integration involves horizontal 
diversification of existing industrial processes. In any event such firms are likely to be 
adept at managing large-scale capital investments and running industrial processes, 
suggesting the internal organisation costs of integration are not large. Furthermore, to the 
extent that integration requires them to be able to contract in wholesale markets for any 
over- or under-capacity, this is less so than if they are reliant solely on contracting. 
In respect of integration involving retail customers there is possibly a case against 
retail customers directly owning upstream generation, since they would require contracts 
with their supplier in any event, and direct ownership would add ownership costs as well 
(particularly where customer interests are not homogeneous). However, smaller 
customers are commonly aggregated via retailers, so upstream or downstream integration 
via (or into) such collective governance vehicles allows scale economies in ownership 
costs. The additional costs of internal organisation may be small, even if retailing and 
generation are distinct types of business activity. One board can effectively monitor more 
than one firm division, and transfer pricing rules between divisions (i.e. the internal 
“wholesale market” price) should make any divisional conflicts of interest transparent to 
the firm and hence inherently manageable. 
 
Complementary Role of Contracting 
While the advantages of vertical integration relative to contracting suggest it is a 
more natural governance form in decentralised electricity systems, this is not to suggest 
that contracting is redundant in integrated systems. For some of the same reasons that 
complete contracting is untenable, perfectly balanced vertical integration is also not to be 
expected. Foremost in this regard is the problem of input and output variability faced by 
generators. Those with uncertain fuel supplies will be willing to integrate only to the 
extent that they expect to be able to meet their embedded load using native generation a 
significant proportion of the time. To the extent they have too much load, at least under 
some fuel supply scenarios, they must supplement native generation capacity by 
purchases from other generators, either on spot or longer-term contract markets. While 
the risk this presents to their overall profitability is likely to be significantly less than for 
suppliers reliant solely on contracting, some risk remains. Conversely, if generators 
under-integrate they will seek to off-load some of their excess capacity via spot markets 
or contracts, the returns from which will  have different risk characteristics. Hence even 
integrated generators will seek to access spot and longer-term contracts markets to some 
degree. 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the relative merits of different types of 
vertical integration in decentralised electricity systems, Figure 5 summarises how the 
location of contracting costs gives rise to differing rationales for integration. 
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 Figure 5: Rationales for Vertical Integration in Decentralised Electricity Systems 
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4.1.2 Upstream Vertical Integration by Large Customers 
 
As already discussed, upstream integration by large customers need not 
significantly increase internal organisation costs while possibly producing significant 
contracting cost savings. The frequency and extent of any contracting is reduced by 
integration, since some or all of the firm’s energy requirements are met internally. 
Horizontally diversifying industrial processes into generation – particularly where co-
generation is involved – should present little additional managerial load. Furthermore, 
co-generation allows the firm to naturally align its production capacity and load profile in 
ways that contracting with external generators may not allow, both reducing contracting 
costs and boosting supply security. It also enables such firms to hedge their input risks, 
especially where their co-generation inputs are also by-products of their industrial 
processes (e.g. biomass in the case of pulp and paper manufacturers). Reduced reliance 
on contract markets leaves large customers less exposed to generator market power, 
information advantages regarding fuel supplies, strategic bargaining and hence adverse 
selection and hold-up risks in contract (re)negotiation. Examples of such upstream 
integration can be found in the New Zealand and Finnish pulp and paper sectors, as well 
as the Queensland aluminium smelter sector (although this may have been the result of 
the subsidised acquisition price – see Turton (2002)). 
 
4.1.3 Upstream Vertical Integration by Retailers 
 
Upstream integration by retailers into generation may be constrained by scale 
differences between the two types of business, as well as possible capital constraints. 
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However, in some cases there can be significant alignment between retailer preferences 
to avoid wholesale price spikes and the risk-management characteristics of peaking plant 
investment. Importantly, the incentive for such upstream investment is affected by 
regulatory or system operation decisions such as price caps or reserves management 
which affect wholesale price peaks. Stand-alone peaking investment relies on transitory 
scarcity rents in wholesale prices, and hence can be made non-viable by constraints on 
price spikes. Similarly the rationale and viability of upstream integration by retailers is 
also reliant on such (avoided) rents. Thus upstream integration by retailers may not be as 
sustainable as downstream integration by generators. 
Where such upstream integration is viable it also protects retailers against the 
possible exercise of generator market power, which is most likely to be exercised in 
periods of tight system balance and hence already high wholesale prices. It also therefore 
protects retailers against generator informational advantages regarding capacity 
availability, and reduces their adverse selection risk otherwise faced in negotiating hedge 
contracts. By internalising the costs of retail-level hold-up, retailer investments in peaking 
capacity are made more viable, which in turn provides credible commitments to funders 
of and fuel suppliers to such generators. 
 
4.1.4 Downstream Vertical Integration by Generators 
 
Downstream integration by generators into retailing can arise for both natural 
and artificial reasons. As discussed above, generators have scale and balance sheet 
advantages that favour their integration into multiple retailers, as opposed to integration 
by multiple retailers into generation (which would raise additional internal organisation 
costs). Furthermore, generators integrate into retailing not to avoid spiking wholesale 
prices (which they would otherwise prefer to face in contract markets), but rather to 
provide a natural hedge against low prices in the context of long-lived investments. This 
makes them naturally less exposed to regulatory or system operation interventions that 
serve to depress wholesale electricity prices. 
Other reasons favouring downstream integration into retailing rather than 
upstream integration into generation include barriers to generation ownership. Capital 
market constraints are one possible barrier, particularly where capital market 
development or depth are insufficient for retailers to raise the large sums required for 
upstream investments into diversified (rather than single plant) generators. In New 
Zealand an additional barrier is state ownership of most of the competing generators 
(Evans and Meade (2005)). Even if retailers had the capital to acquire generation, they 
would be reliant on contracting or generator break-up to off-load any surplus capacity 
acquired, but more importantly the bulk of that generation has simply not been for sale 
due to political opposition to privatisation. In contrast, retail companies were available 
for purchase as a consequence of legislation unbundling distribution and retailing, 
meaning generators were able to buy into such retailers. 
Another rationale for downstream integration involves generators acquiring 
customers to limit their exposure to buyer market power. While this exposure may not 
naturally arise in respect of retail customers, it may do so as a consequence of regulation, 
or in respect of industrial customers. In Australia, for example, aluminium smelters have 
some flexibility over their location, and hence can exert buyer power over stranded 
generation investments by threatening to relocate when renewing long-term contracts. 
Conversely, state buying agencies on behalf of retail customers may exert buyer market 
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power that generators would prefer to avoid through the direct ownership of customer 
bases (e.g. industrial customers, since they are more likely to operate in unregulated 
markets, and the transaction costs of acquiring them may be favourable compared with 
acquiring a base of retail customers). The costs of such hold-up or regulatory risk would 
need to be significant given the internal organisation costs involved in acquiring non-
retail customer bases, however, since generators may lack the expertise to adequately 
manage activities outside of the electricity sector.  
 
4.1.5 Upstream Vertical Integration by Generators 
 
As highlighted in Section 3, hold-up problems at the retail (or large) customer 
level can cause cascading hold-up problems upstream in not just generation, but also 
further upstream in capital and fuel supply. While there would appear to be little rationale 
for upstream integration by generation into capital supply (e.g. banking), except perhaps 
in countries with very poorly developed capital markets and/or capital controls, 
integration into upstream fuel supplies is both more natural and common. Coal-fired 
power stations are often combined with coal-fields (e.g. as in Victoria), perhaps reflecting 
hold-up risks in respect of coal varieties that cannot be economically transported from 
competing non-integrated mines. In New Zealand two major integrated generators have 
considered joint investment in the development of a LNG terminal, and also in gas field 
exploration, to develop secure gas supplies for thermal generation. 
The New Zealand example illustrates three different issues in relation to 
upstream investment by generators. First is the possibility of hold-up in third party gas 
exploration, since these generators have large sunk investments in thermal generation 
that could be stranded once existing gas supplies wind down sooner than originally 
expected. Second is the potential hold-up risk faced by an independent gas explorer, 
particularly given uncertainty in government policy regarding future thermal generation 
investments.14 However, unlike the development of previous gas fields in which domestic 
demand was required to recoup development costs, LNG possibilities now allow for the 
export of any gas not used domestically. The third is the possible importance of vertical 
integration in providing the funding security for such upstream investments. Without 
embedded customers both generators and fuel suppliers would face downstream hold-up 
risks that potentially impede such investments.  
Another possible rationale for upstream integration into fuel supplies is to 
remove exposure to volatile input prices or quantities. This risk is becoming evident in 
European gas supplies, given the increasing market power exerted by Russia. In the same 
way that integration into customers internalises wholesale electricity prices to the firm, so 
too does integration into gas supplies. Additionally, integrating into fuel supplies also 
enables generators to reduce their exposure to adverse regulation. For example, while 
regulation of fuel prices may provide generators advantages in terms of reduced input 
costs, this may be unhelpful to generators if it also suppresses upstream capacity 
investments or exploration. Upstream integration therefore enables generators to 
improve fuel supply security or to better manage price risks, reducing their risk of price 
or quantity squeezes and therefore supporting their generation investments. 
                                                 
14  In December 2008 a newly-elected government overturned legislation passed by its predecessor in September 
implementing a 10 year ban on new thermal generation (except where such generation was required for supply 
security or replaced less efficient thermal plant). 
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While the internal organisation costs of upstream investments by generators may 
be large, hold-up risks in fuel supply mean that contracting may be particularly costly, 
justifying the costs of integration. 
 
4.1.6 Downstream Vertical Integration into Generation 
 
Downstream integration into generation by upstream suppliers sometimes arises. 
As discussed above, there is a possible rationale for downstream investment by fuel 
suppliers where they are exposed to hold-up by generation. This might arise, for example, 
for low-calorific value coal that cannot be economically transported to alternative 
customers if the coal field operator is held up by a generator customer. Alternatively it 
might arise for a gas field developer if there are inadequate domestic alternatives to 
generator buyers, which might arise if sales to non-generators require additional 
infrastructure investments such as in transmission or LNG terminals. 
In New Zealand a more unusual example arises, namely that by a wind turbine 
manufacturer, NZ Windfarms. The company manufactures wind turbines tailored to the 
New Zealand wind generation environment, and it part owns generators that use its 
technology. Even more unusual is the company’s reliance on spot prices rather than 
longer-term contracts to provide investment returns. In part this is because of its stated 
belief that rising thermal generation prices as well as an emissions trading scheme 
legislated in September 2008 will cause spot wholesale prices to rise over time. Its 
downstream integration appears to be a means by which it establishes the viability of its 
wind generation technology – a form of market creation, rather than a means to eliminate 
hold-up risks. 
 
4.2 Alternative Contracting Fixes 
 
With these advantages of vertical integration relative to contracting in mind, we 
now briefly consider possible non-integration based fixes to the problems of contracting 
in decentralised electricity systems. These include regulating for contracts, reducing retail 
competitiveness – such as through reinstating or retaining retail franchises – and other 
demand-side fixes unrelated to retail competition. 
 
4.2.1 Regulating for Contracts 
 
Regulating for contracts is often the principle driver of contracting in 
decentralised electricity systems. Vesting contracts are commonly employed to limit 
market power and provide wholesale price certainty in liberalising systems, particularly 
while generator market power is seen as an important risk. Virtual power plant 
agreements are sometimes imposed on incumbent dominant generators as a means to 
reduce their market share while deferring horizontal de-integration or generator 
privatisation. Long-term contracts can be imposed on generators so that liberalising 
states can offload legacy long-term supply contracts previously entered into with 
industrial customers. Also, contracts have been imposed in states where liberalisation 
processes have not performed in a politically sustainable way, giving rise to reactive 
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interventions (e.g. California, Ontario – see Chao et al. (2005) and Tetrault (2006) 
respectively). 
Regulating for contracts can also arise in other guises. Legislation establishing an 
industry regulator in New Zealand included powers allowing a newly-created regulator – 
the Electricity Commission – to require integrated generators to sell some proportion of 
their output via contracts (Meade (2005), with Willems and De Corte (2008) providing a 
rationale for such regulation). Doing so means that all generators would become over-
committed given their existing embedded load, and have to divest a certain amount of 
that load in order to restore balance. If they did not do so this begs the question as to 
whom would buy such contracts absent a natural customer base. If inadequate entry 
arose following the imposition of such a regulation then generators would remain 
overcommitted, which raises their incentives to increase wholesale prices (Hogan and 
Meade (2007)). The Electricity Commission has to date opted not to exercise its powers 
in this area, preferring alternative approaches to supporting hedge market development 
such as mandating price transparency (Electricity Commission (2006), UMR Research 
(2008)). 
The fact that regulation may be required in order to sustain contracts markets 
begs the question as to the market failure such regulation is intended to remedy. This is 
especially so if vertical integration has been dismantled or prohibited as part of a 
liberalisation process. If either is the case then a potentially endogenous approach to risk 
management has been artificially precluded, and so the basis for regulating for contracts 
is potentially faulty. Where vertical integration is permitted, however, but does not arise, 
a more natural question is why such integration might be impeded, rather than why 
contracts need to be encouraged. If there should happen to be natural impediments to 
vertical integration then there is a clearer rationale for contracting, and hence regulating 
for contracting might have a more sound rationale. 
 
4.2.2 Reducing Retail Competitiveness 
 
It is curious that hold-up problems have arisen in electricity sectors as a 
consequence of retail competition, given that competitive entry into retailing has been 
less than comprehensive (Defeuilley (2008)). Indeed, aside from barriers to retail entry 
such as transmission constraints and vertical integration, there are a range of reasons why 
customers have proved reluctant to switch to new suppliers. Among these are bounded 
rationality (e.g. customers’ inability to understand new retail contracts), and a lack of 
customer motivation (e.g. because power bills are often only a fraction of overall 
household expenditures, so any switching savings are relatively modest). Retail customers 
can also be reluctant to switch suppliers if only short-term contracts are on offer in case 
they face price increases after switching (although Defeuilley (2008) reports that the gains 
from switching tend to be sustained, with incumbent prices typically exceeding entrant 
prices over time). Other explanations include the risk of disconnection from changing 
suppliers, loss of loyalty benefits, or relative unfamiliarity with and hence possible distrust 
of new suppliers. While some “active” customers are highly price-sensitive and inclined 
to switch (Amundsen and Bergman (2006)), most customers are “inactive” and remain 
loyal to their incumbent supplier. 
Additionally, states experiencing the highest levels of customer switching are 
often also those implementing measures favouring entry. For example, Defeuilley (2008) 
reports that Texas, Victoria and South Australia all implemented price regulations 
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designed to encourage entry, for example with incumbent Texas suppliers required to 
offer a regulated “price to beat” until their franchise market share fell below 40%. Hence, 
to the extent that retail entry in such jurisdictions has resulted in hold-up problems, this 
may be a consequence as much of pro-competition regulation as much as flaws in 
contracting or vertical integration. 
Such considerations aside, some authors have proposed the retention or 
reinstatement of retail franchise areas as a solution to hold-up problems created by retail 
entry (Chao et al. (2005), Roques (2008), Newbery (2002, 2005). Doing so means retailers 
have locked-in customer bases that are insulated from competitive predation. This in 
turn reduces their incentive to renege on contractual commitments to generators, and 
affords them greater protection against predation when entering into longer-term supply 
contracts. This reduced hold-up risk induces generators to commit a larger share of their 
output via contracts (assuming they are not already committed via integration), which 
also reduces their incentive to exercise wholesale market power, thereby further 
supporting the use of contracts as a risk management device. Furthermore, reduced hold-
up risks and greater use of long-term contracts with retail counterparties that are less 
likely to face financial distress means generators are better able to manage their 
investment risks, lowering their cost of capital and increasing their access to investment 
capital. By locking in customers retailers should also be able to enter into less diversified 
contracts with generators whose capacity better matches their load requirements (e.g. 
merchant peaking plant), enabling more tailored contracting. 
Such measures may be necessary in electricity systems otherwise lacking natural 
constraints on retail competition (such as transmission constraints), other causes of 
customer “stickiness”, or sources of scarcity rents supporting investment (e.g. as in 
hydro-exposed systems). However, they appear to be a blunt instrument to achieve the 
desired end. For example, similar hold-up risks can also arise in respect of large 
customers operating in competitive output markets (e.g. aluminium smelters), but 
prescribing entry barriers in such markets would seem an unnecessary and unnatural 
response to support generation investment. Additionally, the same considerations 
discussed in relation to regulating for contracting apply, since retaining or reinstating 
retail franchise areas are examples of such regulation.  
Arguments for this approach sit unnaturally alongside the principles underlying 
electricity sector liberalisation, namely the reliance on competition (in some shape or 
form) to produce incentives for efficiency gains and to shift risks from customers and 
taxpayers to investors. Where they rely on contracting supported by franchise areas 
rather than a combination of endogenous vertical integration and residual contracting 
they are potentially both unnecessary and just as unsustainable as unsupported 
contracting, particularly if the well-known incentive problems of franchise areas are not 
addressed. This approach shifts the problems of risk management into the regulatory 
domain, which raises its own hold-up risks and hence threats to investment and supply 
security. If it succeeds, then the risk is that it does so at the undue expense of consumers. 
 
4.2.3 Other Demand-Side Fixes 
 
At least some of the problems presented by contracting can be mitigated by 
demand-side fixes not requiring constraints on retail competition. In particular, there are 
long-standing reform areas such as increasing real-time demand-side responsiveness that 
help to smooth load profiles, reduce demand peaks and uncertainty, mitigate the impacts 
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of generator market power, reduce generation investment needs, and enhance supply 
security.  
If retail customer demand can be better managed so as to avoid peak demands, 
this reduces the need for often idle peaking generation capacity (and hence also the 
possible adverse effects of wholesale price regulation and system operating rules on 
investment). By inducing greater demand-side responsiveness, such as by affording retail 
customers with options to profit by voluntarily curtailing load during times of peak 
demand, the transitory exercise of generator market power during times of tight system 
conditions results in lower welfare loss (Evans and Meade (2005)). Such responsiveness 
could be achieved either ex ante via load limiting devices (Doorman (2003)), or in real 
time via retail power exchanges (Evans and Meade (2005)).  
By reducing the possible welfare losses from generator market power this also 
reduces the need for regulatory interventions such as wholesale price caps, and hence 
supports the lower required levels of capacity investment. In unintegrated systems this 
should also be reflected in lower retail prices, all other things being equal, thus reducing 
the need for further retail competition (which would worsen any hold-up risks). Thus a 
suite of such measures should both reduce contracting costs and improve supply security 
and investment incentives for any given level of retail competition. Where they are 
combined with vertical integration this should be more so, and they also should 
ameliorate concerns that vertical integration creates barriers to retail entry. 
 
Given these considerations we conclude that unless the costs of internal 
organisation are severe, some form of vertical integration is likely to more naturally 
dominate in decentralised electricity systems over contracting as a mechanism to manage 
wholesale price, market power, information asymmetry and investment risks. This leaves 
complementary roles for spot market and long-term contracting, and de-emphasises 
hold-up risks from retail entry. As a consequence integrated sectors should be able to 
sustain greater levels of retail (and industrial customer) competition than de-integrated 
systems, and better enable the generation investment required for supply security. This 
implies a reduced role for distortionary regulation and other political interventions, and 
suggests that the reinstatement or retention of retail franchise monopolies may be 
unnecessary to ensure supply security, particularly if other system characteristics mean 
that retail entry is sufficiently deterred or scarcity rents are generated. These implications 
are explored further in the next section. 
 
5 Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
Decentralised electricity systems have been premised on the efficiency and welfare 
benefits of competition, and have intentionally shifted investment risks from taxpayers and 
consumers to investors. Where this coincided with excess capacity in generation, this has 
supported the evolution of contracts markets and retail entry. However, as capacity margins 
shrink post-liberalisation, the shortcomings of reliance on contracting – hold-up risks, risk-
management mismatches between generators and customers, and market power, asymmetric 
information and strategic bargaining risks – have become apparent. These shortcomings 
hinder new investment and threaten the perpetuation of sub-optimal capacity margins. 
Absent complementary or alternative devices (such as vertical integration, forced contracting 
or capacity obligations) to compensate for such shortcomings, this threatens supply security 
and hence the political sustainability of liberalisation, and risks the introduction of 
destabilising interventions that worsen those shortcomings, or outright recentralisation (e.g. 
heavy regulation or (re-) nationalisation). 
Contracts markets have often arisen more by design than evolution, for example 
reflecting long-term contracts entered into pre-liberalisation by states with industrial 
customers. Often they are imposed to facilitate a transition to generator competition while 
generator dominance is still a concern. Moreover, vertical de-integration has often been a 
concomitant of horizontal de-integration, artificially (if unintentionally) limiting the role of 
vertical integration as a risk management device. These have all served to give contracting a 
prominence that it may not naturally deserve, and eventually highlighted the difficulties in 
sustaining contracting when those rationales have run their course. This raises the question 
whether contracting is simply a stepping stone to greater use of vertical integration (or other 
mechanisms not sharing the shortcomings of contracting). 
As such limitations are revealed the liberalisation pendulum appears to be swinging 
away from pure reliance on contracting in favour of mixed approaches involving either 
endogenous vertical integration or impositions such as capacity mechanisms. Such a swing 
coincides with an evolution in the political imperatives surrounding electricity sector 
liberalisation. Whereas safeguarding consumers against generator market power was 
commonly a political necessity accompanying any shift towards decentralisation, ensuring 
supply security – especially in the face of notable reform failures, and even the healthy 
demise of industry players as part of the competitive process – is increasingly the political 
priority. Where reformers have retained confidence in decentralised solutions this has 
involved a tolerance of greater vertical integration. Otherwise it has involved imposed 
solutions such as capacity obligations, which contain their own inherent shortcomings and 
hence which may prove to be just as unsustainable as a reliance on contracting (e.g. see 
Meade (2005)). 
Importantly, this evolution requires a re-evaluation of the optimal degree of 
competition in electricity systems, particularly in retailing. The analysis in this paper stresses 
that the pursuit of unfettered retail competition – as well as the elimination of other aspects 
of electricity systems limiting competition (e.g. transmission constraints) – exacerbates hold-
up risks, impedes generation investment and hence threatens supply security. Hence 
textbook pure competition should clearly not be the policy aim. The reinstatement of retail 
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franchise monopolies would appear to be an extreme alternative, however, and may only be 
justified in the absence of other inherent barriers to retail competition, or by a lack of other 
system characteristics supporting generation investment. Where such barriers (such as 
“regionalisation” due to grid constraints) arise, or system characteristics (such as prolonged 
rather than only transitory price rises as in hydro-exposed systems) otherwise support 
investment, less extreme levels of retail market power may be sufficient to resolve 
investment and supply security issues. This is particularly so where systems involve 
significant degrees of vertical integration to complement or substitute for contracting, in 
which the hold-up and other risks inherent in contracting are less prominent. 
A key challenge for policymakers wishing to stop short of outright reinstatement of 
retail franchises is to identify the degree of retail market power striking the optimal balance 
between protecting consumers while maintaining efficient investment incentives. Where 
those incentives are distorted by interventions such as price caps – particularly in vertically 
integrated systems where such caps are most likely redundant – the removal of such 
distortions is an obvious starting point. If there is to be a bias in policymakers’ approach, it is 
likely to best be in favour of supporting investment incentives at the possible risk of short-
term retail market power. Policy parameters can then be incrementally refined if it proves 
that investment incentives are overly generous. The difficulty with the alternative approach is 
that undue emphasis on controlling retail market power can – and has – resulted in 
inadequate investment in many systems. The objective should be to encourage desirable 
long-term decision-making even if this involves short-term biases, since the alternative is to 
avoid those biases while forestalling or otherwise distorting those long-term decisions. 
Where other solutions to market power can be implemented without raising retail entry risks 
– such as measures to improve demand side responsiveness – these are worthy of 
exploration in their own right. However, they also de-emphasise the importance of retail 
market competitiveness, and further complement the benefits of vertical integration over 
contracting in electricity systems. 
Abandoning the relentless pursuit of retail market competition involves breaking 
from one of the important premises of reform – that retail prices will be either reduced or 
constrained by greater competition over time. Politicians are required to facilitate or allow 
the emergence of an acceptable level of retail competition, and trust that the decentralised 
investment signals this produces are sufficient to elicit acceptable generation capacity and 
supply security. Alternatively, they can substitute for those signals by imposing investment 
requirements through capacity obligations or otherwise, and in doing so possibly create the 
need for greater interventions should the signals prove inadequate, particularly given the 
greater regulatory risks they create. Where limitations have been revealed in designed 
contracts markets, it should be expected that limitations will also be revealed in alternative 
imposed approaches. The merit of greater use of vertical integration instead of contracting is 
that it better insulates electricity systems from their inherent imperfections, as well as from 
imposed imperfections (e.g. price caps) introduced to address the inherent ones. 
Contracting, just like spot markets, continues to play an important role even in 
vertically integrated systems. Uncertainties in both supply and demand mean integrated 
generators cannot continuously maintain perfect balance between capacity and embedded 
load, and hence can integrate only to some degree. Relying simply on spot trading to 
compensate for any real time imbalances exposes integrated generators to more short-term 
price volatility than is likely to best enable risk-management over their long-lived generation 
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portfolio. Combining such spot trading with a portfolio of longer-term contracts enables 
better matching of investment and risk-management maturities for that part of the 
generator’s portfolio that cannot be perfectly balanced through integration. Integration is 
naturally the dominant risk-management approach where the costs of contracting are large, 
or simply greater than the costs of internal organisation. Just as competition through market 
mechanisms is expected to enable lowest-cost generation to displace higher-cost generation, 
policymakers should anticipate that market mechanisms will also enable the efficient mix of 
contracting and integration to emerge where each is permitted and not impeded. 
There is currently a lack of theoretical work identifying the optimal degree of retail 
competition that supports efficient investment levels and endogenously-determined optimal 
supply security. The discussion in this paper presents a natural framework for modelling the 
optimal use of contracting and integration as a question of mechanism design, given 
different degrees of retail competition. By incorporating complexities such as 
industrial/retail mix, industrial customer market power, the impact on retail competition of 
transmission constraints, demand-side responsiveness and fuel mix and security, it should be 
possible to demonstrate whether integrated, de-integrated or partially integrated systems can 
sustain greater levels of retail competition while maintaining investment levels and supply 
security. This in turn facilitates a dynamic efficiency analysis of the alternatives. Such 
theoretical modelling is left for future work. 
 
* * * 
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Appendix A: Comparison of  Selected Electricity Market Structures 
 Market structure 
characteristics  
Generation characteristics Demand characteristics Trading characteristics  
New 
Zealand 
Sources:1, 2a, 
2b, 2d 
 Generators: 9 total, 5 major  
(generate over 92% total)  
 Retailers: major generators 
are also retailers 
 Transmission: owned and 
operated by SOE 
(Transpower) 
 Distribution: owned and 
operated by 28 lines 
companies  
 Interconnection: none with 
other electricity systems 
 Capacity: 9,000 MW 
 Production: 42,000 GWh 
– Hydro 54.9% 
– Gas 26.4% 
– Geothermal 7.7% 
– Coal 6.9% 
– Wind 2.2% 
– Others 1.8% 
 10% dry year capacity margin  
 Government Security of 
Supply policy: will procure 
Reserve Energy if Winter 
Energy Margin is forecast to 
fall below 17% for New 
Zealand as a whole, or below 
30% for the South Island, over 
the next 3 years; and Winter 
Capacity Margin is forecast to 
fall below 780 MW over next 2 
years  
 
 Consumption: 39,500 GWh  
– Residential 12,700 
– Commercial 9,000 
– Industrial 16,800 (including 
8,000 from largest 
customers) 
– Onsite 1,000 
 Peak demand: 6,500 MW  
 Pricing: nodal 
 Regulation: wholesale prices 
uncapped; transmission and 
distribution (for non-
consumer-owned firms) 
regulated  
 Energyhedge (anonymous 
bilateral trading) volume is low 
(500GWh from 2003-2006)  
 Approx 70% of total load 
hedged through vertical 
integration  
 “Generators” (incl. gentailers):  
– avg. load 36,730 GWh  
– generation 42,022 GWh  
– hedges sold 10,311 GWh 
 “Purchasers”:  
– avg. load 11,810 MWh  
– generation 1,301 GWh 
– hedges bought 8,100 GWh 
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 s racteristics racteristics  Market structure 
characteristics  
Generation characteristic Demand cha Trading cha
Australia 
(NEM) 
Sources: 3, 5, 
2f, 2b, 2d, 4, 
8, 6, 7 
 Generators: 260 registered 
(16 major) 
 Retailers: Full retail 
competition. 4 retailers have 
generation interests 
 Transmission: 5 state-based 
networks (linked by cross 
border interconnectors) 
 Distribution: 13 major 
networks (open access 
distribution 
 Interconnection: only 
between states. Victoria-
Tasmania interconnector 
constrained 
 
 Capacity: 39,400MW 
 Production: 195,000 GWh 
– Black coal 59% 
– Brown coal 25% 
– Natural gas 8.5% 
– Hydro 7.2% 
– Oil + other 0.3% 
(other includes: biomass, wind 
power, solar photovoltaic) 
 Capacity margin: approx 30%  
 Primary capacity standard 
based on quantities of expected 
un-served energy (EUSE) of 
up to .002% of annual demand 
 Consumption: 
– industry 44.6% 
– residential 27.4% 
– commercial and public 
services 26.9% 
– transport 1.1% 
 Peak demand: 30,000 MW 
 
 
 Pricing: zonal 
 Regulation: spot price cap of 
AUD10,000 per MWh; spot 
price minimum of AUD-1,000  
 Majority (>95%) of standard 
contracts traded through the 
use of brokers, with 
counterparty revealed once 
contract is struck. The various 
zones trade 3-4 times the spot 
trading volumes  
 Purely cash-settled financial 
derivatives market, based on 
fixed for floating swap 
contracts settled against spot 
price 
 Electricity futures contracts are 
listed on a calendar quarter 
basis out to 4 years ahead and 
also trade in 1 year tranches  
 OTC negotiated constitutes 
approximately ½ of futures 
turnover  
 Contract trade increased to > 
physical volume in Q1 2007  
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 s ics  Market structure 
characteristics  
Generation characteristic Demand characteristics Trading characterist
United 
Kingdom:  
(NETA/ 
BETTA)15 
Sources: 2e, 
2b, 12, 2d 
 Generators: 7 major. 50 % of 
generating capacity owned by 
gentailers 
 Retailers: 6 major retailers 
supply 99% of customers; all. 
are gentailers 
 Transmission: owned and 
operated by National Grid 
 Distribution: 14 areas 
operated by 7 licensed 
companies (must be separate 
from supply) 
 Interconnection: limited 
links with France and Ireland 
 
 Market governed by the 
Balancing and Settlement 
Code “BSC” Panel, 
representing generators, 
retailers, retail customers, 
Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets “OFGEM”, 
National Grid UK 
“NGUK”,  distributors and 
independent advisers 
 Capacity: 76,000 MW 
– Coal 35%  
– Gas 33%  
– Nuclear 14% 
– Oil 5% 
– Peak hydro 4% 
– Other renewable 3% 
– Other 3% 
 Production: 390,000 GWh 
 
 Peak reserve margin: 19%  
 Capacity requirement standard 
based on a loss-of-load 
expectation (LOLE) ranging 
from 2.4 to 8 hours per annum 
 No complementary 
mechanisms for capacity 
adequacy except that system 
operator can contract for 
generation reserve if risk 
identified  
 Peak demand: 60,000 MW  
 
 Pricing: non-locational 
 Regulation:  
 Prices set via discriminatory / 
pay-as-bid auction  
 UKPX power exchange 
(incorporating previous APX 
exchange) is dominant 
exchange for range of 
contracts: spot and prompt 
through to futures and 
forwards up to 10 seasons out  
 OTC spot = 11% of 
consumption; longer OTC 
contracts (brokered) = 146%  
 Forward contracts market 
exhibits reasonable liquidity in 
contracts up to 12 months, but 
not longer-term contracts  
 Nearly 80% of activity is on 
electronic platforms with the 
total contracts market size 
being approximately 4 times 
the physical market 
 5% of total demand traded in 
balancing mechanism  
                                                 
15  NETA became BETTA in 2005, when extended to include Scotland  
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 n characteristics racteristics  Market structure 
characteristics  
Generatio Demand characteristics Trading cha
United 
States 
(PJM) 
Sources: 2e, 2a
 Generators: all major 
generators also retailers (but 
corporate separation 
required for upstream 
activities ) 
 Retailers: 350 suppliers  
 Transmission: Utilities own 
transmission lines, but 
transmission lines controlled 
by ISO  
 Distribution: utility-owned 
 Interconnection: 13 States + 
DC all interconnected 
 Retail competition differs by 
state e.g. Pennsylvania 
forbids long-term bilateral 
contracts between a load-
serving entity and a large 
industrial customer 
 
 Capacity: 
– Coal 56% 
– Nuclear 34% 
– Gas 7% 
– Oil 0.5% 
– Renewables 2% (incl. 2% 
wind) 
 Production: 700,000 GWh 
 Capacity margin: 19% 
 Capacity contracting 
requirement on all LSEs (PJM 
requires all retailers to hold a 
portfolio of installed capacity 
contracts) + market in which 
capacity credits can be traded. 
Significant penalties on LSEs 
with insufficient credits  
 Capacity requirement standard 
based on a loss-of-load 
expectation (LOLE) ranging 
from 2.4 to 8 hours per annum 
 
 Peak demand: 131,000 MW  
 
 
 Pricing: nodal 
 Regulation: Consumer tariffs 
not regulated  
 Many utilities operating under 
negotiated generation rate caps 
for supply services (through to 
end of 2009/10) 
 Predominantly OTC market. 
Some standard contracts 
through NYPX and 
Continental electronic 
exchanges 
 Voluntary two-tier settlement 
Day-ahead market with real 
time balancing. Ex-ante hourly 
price is a weighted average of 
five-minute prices. LMP 
pricing model including  
congestion only. Reserves 
scheduled into the real time 
market and settled at day-ahead 
clearance prices. Energy offer 
price cap of $1,000/MWh; 
Regulation offer price cap of 
$100/MWh  
 Mainly bespoke contracts  
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Generation characteristic Demand characteristics Trading characteristics  
United 
States: 
(New 
England - 
NEPOOL) 
Sources: 10, 
12 
 Generators: 7 major, 
integrated with retail 
 Interconnection: between 
Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island 
and Vermont 
 
 Capacity: 31,000 MW 
– Gas CCGT 36% 
– Oil/gas ST 20% 
– Nuclear 15% 
– Coal 9% 
– Renewable 9% 
– Oil/gas peaking 6% 
– Pumped storage 5% 
 Reserve margin 2007: 18%  
 
 Consumption: 135,000 GWh 
 Peak demand: 28,000 MW 
 
 Pricing: locational marginal 
pricing (an internal hub, eight 
load zones and more than 500 
nodes) 
 Five markets: 
– Energy market: two-
settlement (day ahead and 
real-time) spot market  
– Capacity market 
– Forward reserves market 
– Regulation market, and 
– Financial transmission 
rights market. FTRs can be 
acquired in three ways: 
1. FTR Auction  
2. Secondary Market (ISO-
administered bulletin board for 
bilateral trading)  
3. Unregistered Trades. 
(However, ISO only 
compensates FTR holders on 
record)  
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Spain 
Sources: 13, 
8e, 14 
 Generators: largest 3 
generators (all gentailers) 
produce 56.4% of energy; 3 
next largest produce 11.9%; 
others produce <2%  
 Retailers: 3 largest (all 
gentailers) account for 92.2% 
of sales 
 Interconnection: very limited 
interconnection with France 
and Portugal – imports total 
8,830 GWh (approx 3.5% 
total consumption) exports 
9,860 GWh  
 
 
 Capacity: 78,300 MW  
– Hydro 21% 
– CCGT 20% 
– Coal 15% 
– Wind 14% 
– Nuclear 10% 
– Fuel/gas 8% 
– Other 12% 
 Production: 306,400 GWh  
– CCGT 31% 
– Coal 24% 
– Nuclear 18% 
– Hydro 10% 
– Wind 9% 
– Oil 6% 
 Capacity margin: 86% 
 Due to strong financial 
incentives, installed capacity of 
renewable generation (wind 
and solar) is rapidly increasing  
 Consumption: 249,700 GWh 
– Industry 42.8% 
– Residential 26.3% 
– Commercial/other 30.9% 
 Peak demand: 42,200 MW 
 Trading platforms: 
– Bilateral contracting 
– Futures market 
– Day-ahead market 
– Adjustment and balancing 
markets 
– AGC market 
– Reserve markets 
 Spot traded volume as a 
percentage of national 
electricity consumption:  
84.02% through OMEL 
(power exchange), negligible 
brokered  
 Through 2005, most trading 
took place through OMEL 
because other trades not 
eligible for capacity payments; 
rule change has led to decrease 
in OMEL trading 
 Relatively small number of 
market participants accounts 
for a large part of the overall 
spot volume traded on both 
the selling and buying side 
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Generation characteristic Demand characteristics Trading characteristics  
Nordpool 
Sources: 2e, 8e, 
14 
 Interconnection:  Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
all highly interconnected, but 
some constraints remain, 
mostly due to geography 
 Total imports = 51.3TWh, 
total exports = 40TWh; 
Norway and Finland net 
importers, Sweden and 
Denmark net exporters 
 Each country has own retail 
market and TSO; increasing 
vertical integration within 
countries 
 Production: 400,000 GWh 
– Thermal 24% 
– Nuclear 26% 
– Hydro 48% 
– Geothermal + other 2% 
 Generation type varies 
significantly between countries: 
Norway predominantly hydro, 
Finland & Denmark 
predominantly thermal, 
Sweden predominantly nuclear 
 Concern at the lack of 
generation investment – to the 
extent that some Norwegian 
industrial users have decided to 
invest directly in generation  
 
 Consumption: 389,300 GWh 
 Peak demand: 60,000 MW  
 
 Pricing: Elspot sets price based 
on unconstrained 
interconnected grid. If 
constraints, area prices are 
applied. In 2004, single system 
price applied for less than 20% 
of the total hours 
 Regulation: Hedge market has 
significant rules, which cover 
trading, the products that can 
be listed, and information 
disclosure (e.g. no insider 
trading)  
 3 voluntary markets:  financial 
derivatives market (Eltermin), a 
day-ahead spot market (Elspot) 
and an hour-ahead market 
(Elbas) 
 Annual contract trades 
represent approx 5 times the 
physical volume of the market  
 four standard contracts based 
on system (unconstrained) 
price: baseload forwards and 
futures, swaptions & CFD 
 Approximately 30% of total 
physical electricity supply and 
demand is traded through 
Elspot 
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Chile 
(CDEC) 
Sources: 2e 
 Interconnection: two 
interconnected power 
systems – Central 
Interconnected System 
“CDEC-SIC” (coordinates 
energy for 17 generators and 
8 interconnected 
transmission companies) and 
System of Norte Grande 
“CDEC-SING (6 
participating generators and 
1 transmission company) 
 
 Capacity: 
– CDEC-SIC: 7,000MW 
– CDEC-SING 3,600MW 
 Production: 45,000 GWh  
– Thermal 20% 
– Hydro 80% 
 Capacity margin: 27-140% 
 Capacity payments to 
generators included in node 
prices 
 Operates peak capacity market 
based on a capacity 
requirement placed on 
generators 
 Additional mechanisms used to 
ensure system adequacy 
include: 
– a) Compensation payments 
for supply outages 
– b) Firm capacity transfers 
– c) Capacity payments 
– d) Hydro investment 
incentive 
 
 Peak demand: 5,500 MW in 
CDEC-SIC and 1,500MW in 
CDEC-SING 
 Large customers (>0.5MW 
load) account for 46% total 
consumption  
 Large customers (>0.5MW 
load) enter contracts directly 
with generators – price not 
regulated 
 
 Pricing: Nodal. Market nodal 
prices calculated by the market 
operator include costs of 
reserves and transmission 
congestion  
 Centralised cost-based bidding 
system where lowest short-run 
marginal cost generation is 
dispatched first 
 Distribution prices set 
biannually by National Energy 
Commission (CNE), which 
also analyses need for new 
generation capacity 
 Risk managed largely through 
OTC contracts and vertical 
integration. No exchange 
trading of contracts 
 Regulation: high degree market 
regulation 
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Argentina 
(MEM) 
Sources: 2e 
 Generators: 38 
 Retailers: Since 2002, vertical 
integration has been allowed 
to increase partly because of 
the need to improve the 
financial viability of 
generating companies. There 
is now a lot of cross 
shareholding between 
generation and distribution/ 
retail 
 Transmission: 7 
 Distribution: 64 
 Interconnection: with Chile, 
Uruguay, Paraguay and 
Brazil. In 2003 exports were 
2,550GWh and imports 
7,600 GWh 
 
 8 energy traders act as load 
aggregators for large 
companies (cannot own 
utilities or assets)  
 Capacity: 30,000 MW 
 Production:92,000 GWh  
– Thermal 52% 
– Hydro 41% 
– Nuclear 7% 
 Capacity margin: 100% 
 
 Consumption: 101,000 GWh 
 Peak demand: approx 15,000 
MW 
 2308 large consumers 
 Consumers with annual 
demand greater than 1 MW 
can buy and sell in wholesale 
spot market but must contract 
for at least 50% of their load 
 Consumers with demand less 
than 1MW must contract 
100% of their load with a 
distributor 
 
 Pricing: nodal prices include 
losses, transmission  
congestion and security costs 
 Two separate MEM market 
energy prices calculated by 
Cammesa: spot and seasonal  
 Zonal congestion pricing for 
transmission Regulation: high 
degree market regulation 
 Risk managed largely through 
OTC contracts (approximately 
50% of the market), and an 
increasing amount of vertical 
integration. No formal 
exchange for contracts trading  
 All generating plants required 
to declare availability in July 
and December – thermal and 
nuclear must submit bids for 
every hour for next six month 
period. Bids cannot exceed 
115% of actual fuel costs but 
they can be adjusted within the 
6-month period if fuel prices 
fluctuate significantly 
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